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Latin American Neostructuralism: 
The Evolution of a Paradigmatic Synthesis 
by Colin E Hamlin 
Abstract 
A new paradigm for economic development as emerged in Latin America that promises 
to combine reactivated economic growth with social equity and political democracy. 
Latin American neostructuralism constitutes a pragmatic paradigm for development that 
overcomes the revolutionary and fundamentalist idealism that had earlier characterized 
development approaches in the region. The evolution of the neostructuralist synthesis is 
traced through the development crisis of the 1980s and into the restructuring of the 
1990s. The integrated policy framework is then deconstructed to show how 
neostructuralism justifies its policy recommendations, revealing its core assumptions and 
contradictions. The limit of the neostructuralist synthesis is found to be its tendency to 
reduce the complexity of development issues to mechanical problems, curable by simply 
implementing enlightened economic policies. 
December 7th, 2009 
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Latin America has undergone several drastic socioeconomic transformations in the last 
quarter of the 20th century. Practically serving as the laboratory for various approaches to 
development, Latin America has often witnessed rapid and dramatic swings in its policy 
orientations. In the wake of a catastrophic developmental crisis in the 1980s, a neoliberal 
wave swept over the region, replacing the previous state directed development model of 
the post-war era with a new, market-centered approach. Yet by the turn of the 21st 
century, it has been increasingly recognized that the neoliberal ideal is neither practical 
nor sufficient for the region to address its basic developmental challenges. Just at this 
time, the neostructuralist approach burst on to the seen, promising to achieve the widely 
desired reactivated economic growth, but to do so in a more humane and socially 
acceptable way. 
Neostructuralism was officially founded in 1990 with Changing Production 
Patterns with Social Equity, published by United Nations Economic Commission on 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC 1990). Neostructuralism has served as the 
overarching development paradigm and analytic framework guiding thinking of the 
ECLAC, the most influential economic think tank in the region. By the early years of the 
21st century, neostructuralism has emerged as the leading development paradigm for the 
region, most strongly informing the governments of Chile and Brazil. It is also serving as 
a reference point for alternative approaches to development and as an anchor for 
discourse and debates amongst the regions main development institutions. 
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Neostructuralism aims to draw upon the best insights of both the earlier state-led 
structuralist paradigm and the newer market-oriented neoliberal paradigm, to form a new, 
more integrated and holistic development vision. It attempts to combine economic 
growth, social equity, and political inclusiveness in a mutually reinforcing way, 
overcoming some of the trade-offs between these goals that had characterized earlier 
development paradigms. Neostructuralism promises to do so by harnessing the 
advantageous forces within the globalization process not by resisting them, but by a 
careful insertion into the globalization process and by a constant effort at realignment to 
changing circumstances. As a result, the neostructuralist paradigm, and the governments 
embracing its key proposals, have been celebrated in the region as hailing a return to 
pragmatism, after decades of failed revolutionary and fundamentalist idealism. 
Having recently emerged as the leading developmental paradigm in Latin 
America, critical discussion of its role as an innovative approach to development is 
lacking. This is compounded by the tendency of critical analyses to be carried out from 
perspectives already partial to neostructuralism, and if not, favouring one of its 
paradigmatic predecessors, state-led structuralism or market-led neoliberalism. 
Consequently, neostructuralism has been described both as an updated structural 
approach, and alternatively and as moderated neoliberal one. These studies tend to 
underestimate the innovative theoretical combinations that make up neostructuralism's 
core ideas. This study will thus focus on evaluating neostructuralism from the perspective 
of its own proclaimed objectives, accepting critiques and insights from both ECLAC's 
structuralist past and the more recent neoliberalism. 
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The main question to be addressed is how does the neostructuralist synthesis 
overcome the dialectic differences between its paradigmatic predecessors, structuralism 
and neoliberalism, into a new paradigm that has eclipsed both earlier ones? So far 
neostructuralism has been very successful at availing critiques from either the 
structuralist or neoliberal camps. How can neostructuralism combine both structuralism's 
focus on the 'system', and neoliberalism's focus on the 'individual'? What are the 
limitations of this synthesis, and what is over-expressed? Particular attention will be 
placed on the role of the state in the developmental process. The focus on the role of the 
state should reveal the nature of the synthesis given that structuralists basically viewed it 
as an essential agent for overcoming structural blocks to development, whereas 
neoliberals saw it more as overbearing and the chief problem getting in the way of 
development. 
To cast light on this problem, we will look into the nature of the relationship 
between neostructuralism and its predecessors, both structuralism and neoliberalism. It is 
acknowledged that neostructuralism is both more - and less - than the average of 
structuralism and neoliberalism. Some ideas have been disregarded, others modified, 
while a whole new set of innovative conceptions and theorization has been created. At 
the same time, the neostructuralist synthesis has generated new internal contradictions, 
stemming from omissions and inconsistencies. Even so, the discursive armour of 
neostructuralism has proven formidable, as it weaves a web of checks and fail-safes that 
has so far resisted most critical challenges. In order to sidestep some of these discursive 
roadblocks, the analysis will undergo a comprehensive analysis of its main policy 
proposals. The nature of the proposed state interventions into the market and their 
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justifications will be highlighted to reveal exactly how neostructuralism views the proper 
balance between the market and the state. Corrections for market failures at a 
microeconomic level, competition policies at a meso-economic level, and overall 
productive orientations at macro levels will be examined. The study will also situate the 
rise of neostructuralism in its historical context. The natures of neostructuralism's 
conceptual and theoretical innovations are intimately tied to the widespread restructuring 
projects in the region, the weakness and decline of structuralism, and the exhaustion of 
neoliberal reforms. First, however, we must clearly define neostructuralism in the 
broadest sense, and deconstruct its many meanings and conceptual innovations. 
What is Latin American Neostructuralism? 
Latin American Neostructuralism can be defined, in the broadest sense, as a development 
paradigm. While only partially applicable to paradigms in the social science, 
neostructuralism meets Kuhn's (1962) definition of a paradigm. It contains a worldview, 
a set of methods, and a body of intellectuals engaged in its reproduction. In some ways, 
neostructuralism serves to resurrect the field of development economics from its terminal 
decline experienced in the 1980s. Neostructuralism was being formulated in the context 
of the ascendance of orthodox economics, that is, economics that is the same in both 
developing and developed countries. The subfield of development economics was ejected 
from the economics departments of many universities in the 1980s, losing its academic 
standing and intellectual authority. Neostructuralism reverses this trend, proposing 
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economic concepts, theories, and models that are specific to the Latin American region, 
making use of many heterodox tools. 
At the heart of neostructuralism is a comprehensive development strategy. It 
proposes to identify the main obstacles to development and to advance a plan of action 
suitable to achieve the established objectives. The development strategy includes both 
long-term and short-term considerations that together form a strategy for immediate, 
persistent and progressive change in a desired direction. While many of its 
recommendations are geared towards policy makers, the integrated strategy speaks to the 
role of all kinds of actors, from transnational corporations, to civil society, entrepreneurs, 
the government, and labour. The strategy aims to propose a way forward that highlights 
the common interests of these various actors, so that to the maximum extent possible they 
work in together in a concerted way. 
Neostructuralism also serves to offer a policy framework and specific 
recommendations in almost all areas of public policy. From macroeconomic, to 
productive development, to social and environmental concerns, neostructuralism's 
integrated policy framework ties these together. Furthermore, these various realms of 
public policy are integrated so that all work synergistically and complementarily, rather 
than focusing on their own specific concerns. By way of these recommended policies, 
neostructuralism moves from the theoretical realm into really existing action-oriented 
proposals. These proposals are almost always designed to be immediately implementable 
as well. Far from being idealist or revolutionary, the policies aim to work at the margins 
of the status quo with a significant attention to political feasibility. 
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The main desired outcomes of this strategy are the achievement of economic 
growth and the equitable distribution of its fruits. Neostructuralists highlight the 
synergies between growth and equity while downplaying the contradictions, with the aim 
of creating a wide base of support. The means of achieving these goals, in the 
neostructuralist paradigm, are to attain a kind of international competitiveness that goes 
beyond the simple profitability of individual firms, to include the socioeconomic system 
as a whole, a kind of "systemic competitiveness." This new idea of competitiveness is 
based heavily on the concept of social cohesion. Only through collective, concerted 
action, can Latin American economies hope to compete in the ever more competitive 
international arena. Owing to this requirement for social cohesion, neostructuralism 
attains its principle systemic character. 
Fernando Leiva (2009) offers an important insight to define neostructuralism as 
not only a development strategy, but also as a "grand narrative" of the path towards 
"progressive modernity". Neostructuralism essentially offers both the proposed pathway 
(modernization), and the destination (modernity). Leiva argues that for neostructuralists, 
"the actions of the state and political institutions have to create new types of expectations, 
new citizens, and new ways of understanding citizenship—that is, a new political 
culture—as well as those attitudes and behaviours congruent with this new master 
narrative." Cooperation, and solidarity-based modernization are to replace previous 
conflictive approaches, allowing for new social accords that promote a negotiated 
solution to conflicts. In this way, neostructuralism forcefully displaces revolutionary and 
idealistic paths to modernity, absorbing a vast array of social demands into a unified 
development "imaginary". 
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Finally, it must be noted that Latin American Neostructuralism is very much a 
work in progress. Having gestated in the late 1980s, it was founded in 1990, but has since 
been updated, modified, and expanded to include many different dimensions of 
development. From the beginning, neostructuralists pointed out that they did not claim to 
have all the answers, and that the debate over development is not over. A sense of 
humility can be detected in the key documents. Jose Antonio Ocampo, former Executive 
Secretary of ECLAC noted: "The enormous intellectual challenges and practical tasks 
that are involved in the recognition of these factors should foster a sense of humility. The 
idea that 'we already know what must be done' is nothing more than a sign of arrogance 
on the part of the economics profession, which has only worsened since the rise to 
dominance of orthodox development thinking in the 1980s" (Ocampo 2001). In this way, 
neostructuralism remains flexible enough to incorporate a learning process as the results 
of reforms come in, and as the rapidly changing global economy continues to pose new 
challenges. 
Rise of Latin American Neostructuralism 
Latin American neostructuralism grew in influence over the course of the 1990s. At the 
time of the publication of its founding document in 1990, the climate of opinion in 
development circles, especially those in Latin America, reflected the ascendance of the 
neoliberal paradigm. The rise of neostructuralism was thus closely intertwined with the 
decline of neoliberalism, as one grew to displace the other. Even though neoliberal ideas 
reached the pinnacle of their influence around 1990, the wider development landscape 
10 
continually changed, incorporating new ideas, shifting focus, and addressed the major 
global economic changes then taking place. 
The origin of neostructuralism was the development crisis of the 1980s. After the 
outbreak of the debt crisis in 1982, Latin America found itself caught between the 
imperatives of external adjustment and internal stabilization. Efforts to reach a new 
macroeconomic equilibrium were enormously costly for the region. As a result, the 1980s 
have come to be known as the "lost decade" for development. After decades of political 
instability and military dictatorship in the region, civilian governments slowly returned to 
power over the course of the 1980s, culminating in the defeat of Pinochet in the 1989 
referendum in Chile. Neostructuralism thus addressed questions of political expediency 
and feasibility in the context of these new and often fragile democracies. 
In addition to these new sociopolitical realities, neostructuralism emerged in the 
context of a new and evolving intellectual climate. The collapse of the Soviet empire was 
the most dramatic factor, clearly undermining all efforts at planned economic models. In 
addition, orthodox neoclassical economics, which was heavily employed by the 
neoliberal reformers, was also being updated. A new group of growth theories emerged 
that took better account of technological change and endogenous growth dynamics. As 
well, the 1980s saw the rise of New Institutional Economics, which tends to compliment 
neoclassical economics with an increased focus on institutions, transaction costs, and 
long term path dependencies in economic development (Ficker and Kuntz 2005). 
Overall, neoclassical economics grew to incorporate a more diverse set of 
variables, including technology, institutions, information asymmetries, and market 
failures. These theoretical developments, combined with an early picture of the economic 
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results of the neoliberal reform process, led to the inauguration of the "post-Washington 
Consensus" (Stiglitz 1998). This meant that even US based development institutions, the 
guardians of orthodoxy in development thinking, were beginning to recognize that while 
less state intervention in the economy was called for, the state did have a strategic role to 
play to support markets and ensure their smooth functioning. In this way, there were 
increasing calls to 'bring the state back in'. 
The United Nations Development Program also pioneered the idea of human 
development (UNDP 1990). Moving beyond econometric characterizations, this new 
approach put human development at the centre, necessitating an increased focus on 
education, social welfare, health, opportunity, and participation. The human development 
index drew attention to the non-economic dimensions of development. 
Ocampo remarked that by the turn of the 20th century, these new concerns were 
being felt at all levels of the development community: "recent events and the discontent 
they have generated have, in turn, spurred a constructive debate that promises to enrich 
the development agenda. The last few years have indeed made the debate somewhat more 
pluralistic. Alternative views of development have made some headway" (Ocampo 
2002). Even so, the so called post-Washington Consensus was largely seen as just adding 
on these new concerns to a still intact core favouring unbridled marketization. Ocampo 
went on to lament, that "new concepts and areas of emphasis are often mere "add-ons" to 
what is, by and large, the same policy agenda, with new generations of reforms simply 
being appended to what are regarded essentially as the correct foundations. Seen in a less 
favourable light, they are merely new garments draped over the same ideas. Markets, 
particularly financial markets, have not really internalized the need for a new 
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development agenda." As a result, both the WC and the PWC suffered from a lack of 
credibility. By the early 21st century, they came to be seen as a "damaged brand name", 
that "instead of prosperity, the consensus now emits the poisonous odors of a recipe 
concocted in Washington by a cabal of inept technocrats who are out of touch with the 
realities of poor countries or, even worse, are in the pockets of Wall Street" (Nairn 2002). 
The need then, was not just to patch up the ailing neoliberal paradigm but to propose a 
new paradigm, with social, environmental, and equity concerns integrated with the drive 
for smooth functioning markets. 
From this point, one can see how the situation in Latin America was ripe for a 
more holistic development paradigm to emerge, and displace, the faltering neoliberal 
paradigm. Neostructuralism thus found its first early expression in Chile with the rise of 
the Concertacion government in 1990. Much later, after 2003, it grew to inform a number 
of governments, especially Lula's Brazil, and more recently in Uruguay. By 2009, 
neostructuralism has moved to the very centre of the development debate, displacing the 
Washington centred institutions, and causing them to reach a theoretical impasse - with 
the current trend that they are increasingly adopting neostructuralists' ideas or risk 
becoming irrelevant. 
What is being said (and written) about Neostructuralism: How is it understood 
today? 
There has been only a limited amount of critical analysis of the neostructuralist paradigm. 
During the 1990s, neostructuralism rose from under the radar of critical development 
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theorists, as they were more concerned with the evolution and crisis of neoliberalism. 
When neostructuralism gained more attention with the rise of centrist political regimes in 
Latin America in the 21st century, it was often taken for granted as being a better, more 
humane, moderated, or pragmatic development model. Many analyses compare 
neostructuralism to neoliberalism and come to the basic conclusion that neostructuralism 
is superior because of its increased attention to institutions, political processes, and equity 
(Kirby 2003). Nevertheless, a few critical strands have emerged, with only limited 
agreement between them of the developmental significance of neostructuralism, its 
origins, and its relationship with neoliberalism and structuralism. 
It is most widely accepted that neostructuralism has had to adjust its analytic 
framework to the realities of Latin America's New Economic Model (NEM) and its 
position in the rapidly evolving world economy. Some argue these change have been for 
better or worse, but all of them recognize that the new developmental environment has 
been a central concern of the new paradigm. ECLAC's Osvaldo Rosales commented that 
the new global environment favours an orientation towards the world market, and 
necessitates innovation and flexibility. He argues that consequently both the socialist 
model and the market model do not meet the new regime requirements that Latin 
America must address (Rosales 1995). For him, it is necessary to combine the old 
progressive ideas of equity and social justice with external restraints of international 
competitiveness. The idea is that neostructuralism should maintain the same basic social 
concerns, but needs to address different economic requirements, so the path to achieve 
the social goods must change. This sentiment that neostructuralism has had to adapt to 
new circumstances is shared not only by ECLAC insiders, but also by critical 
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development intellectuals. Gwynne and Kay find the same: "neostructuralism should not 
be interpreted as caving in to neoliberalism nor as an indication that structuralism was 
wrong but rather as an attempt to come to terms with a new reality... In this sense 
(neo)structuralism is showing an ability to adapt to changing historical circumstances 
rather than remain frozen in the past" (Gwynne and Kay 2004). This sense that it was 
necessary to adapt to the new globalization process can be seen in ECLAC documents 
themselves, where it is argued that it would be impossible to resist globalization, and it is 
a better option to adapt to it (ECLAC 2002). The more moderated tone that Lula himself 
held once he was elected is reflected in some of his statements and views on the new 
circumstances. Lula explained his new position: 'I changed, Brazil changed', he repeated 
on Brazilian T.V. (Reid 2007). 
It is important to note that the first manifestation of neostructuralist thought was 
in the late 1980s, and was in a response to the highly regressive and costly adjustment 
programs being imposed on Latin America from the International Development 
Institutions. As a result, some of the early critiques of neostructuralism are limited to 
these short term macroeconomic considerations in the context of the drive for 
stabilization and adjustment, rather than on any long term development strategy (Bitar 
1988; Ffrench-Davis 1988). Even so, well into the 1990s the legacy of the crisis was 
central in the new formulations, as Sunkel argued that the neostructuralist paradigm's 
pragmatism resulted in large part from efforts to "synthesize and render consistent the 
guiding principles underlying the manifold proposals suggested to overcome the crisis" 
(Sunkel 1993). Nevertheless, in the wake of the shortcomings of these heterodox 
stabilization efforts, Sunkel sees neostructuralism as returning to incorporate the long 
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term considerations that were once at the heart of structuralism: "the neostructuralists 
returned for inspiration to the positive legacy of Latin American structuralism... as a 
consequence of the change of historical circumstances in which they were formulated, the 
neostructuralists revised some of their assumptions and tried to remedy their 
deficiencies." 
There is also an agreement that neostructuralism represents a more pragmatic 
approach to development. Neoliberalism has been often criticized for being excessively 
idealist, and unable to offer practical solutions in the really existing world. This sentiment 
was reflected in the founding documents of neostructuralism itself that presented a sense 
of urgency, and the requirement to propose practical solutions, not idealistic Utopian 
visions. Two of the founders of the neostructuralist paradigm commented: "the region's 
crisis is serious enough without adding to it a narrow minded and simplistic view of 
reality... because the region faces enormous challenges and the scarcity of resources is 
greater than ever, an innovative and renovated approach is required... it becomes 
imperative again to analyze and understand the real nature and full complexity of 
economic issues" (Ramos and Sunkel 1993). This gives us a sense that the architects of 
neostructuralism opted for pragmatism based out of necessity, rather than by giving up on 
their long term hopes for Latin America's transformation. This sense that short-term 
challenges must be dealt with first, with a mind to keep as many long term paths to more 
substantial structural change open for the future, is present in many of ECLAC's 
documents. In a CEPAL Review article published in the same year as Changing 
Production Patterns, two neostructuralists, in their comparison between neostructuralism 
and neoliberalism, find the same: "it would appear that on the basis of pragmatic 
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considerations and the lessons of experience correctly interpreted, our countries are 
moving towards a compromise between the less extreme neoliberal positions and the 
traditional economic conceptions of Latin American development, duly reformulated" 
(Sunkel and Zuleta 1990). Years later, it was recalled how the pragmatic tone of 
neostructuralism was directly related to the new climate of opinion regarding 
development strategy in the wake of the major world political and ideological 
transformations: "this compromise between the two proposals is derived perhaps from 
frustrating experiences in one camp or another, from the crisis conditions which continue 
painfully and interminably, and from the less ideological and more pragmatic attitudes 
that are beginning to dominate in these first years after the cold war" (Sunkel 1993). This 
suggests that the ends have changed less than the means to achieve them. 
The characterization of pragmatism has been especially applied to the Latin 
American governments, in particular to Chile's Concertacion and Brazil's PT. Javier 
Santiso (2006) argues that these new governments, which are strongly influenced by the 
neostructuralist paradigm, represent a new "political economy of the possible". Santiso 
argues that this move towards pragmatism was a result of the costly learning processes of 
the impossibility of either socialist revolution or pure marketization. These centrist 
governments are also praised by other commentaries of contemporary Latin American 
development, who fault both the ardent neoliberal extenders, and the radical bloc for their 
un-sustainability, polarizing effects and lack of compromise (Reid 2007). 
Some have emphasized how neostructuralism has played an important role in the 
political process and discourse in these new fragile democracies. The limits of what is 
acceptable to talk about have been expanded as a "rise of polycentric development 
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coalitions" holds out the possibility "to deepen and effectively extend democracy beyond 
the electoral arena to include basic issues related to the construction of more just societies 
in the hemisphere" (Korzeniewicz and Smith 1999). The astute critic of neostructuralism, 
Fernando Leiva, argues that neostructuralism has reshaped the entire political discourse: 
"it is in the realm of politics more than the strictly economic where neostructuralist 
conceptualizations seem to be currently having their greatest impact... It is here where 
neostructuralism fully assumes its role as providing a grand narrative for Latin America's 
path toward modernity in the twenty first century" (Leiva 2009). Proponents of 
neostructuralism argue that the new politics provides a new opportunity to achieve social 
cohesion and thus international competitiveness. However, Leiva finds that the particular 
way that institutions and politics have been reinserted into the development debate have 
led to the unexpected "heterodox paradox", that "in the quest of international 
competitiveness, Latin American neostructuralism's carefully crafted policies aimed at 
consensus building, expanding participatory governance, and fostering a new type of civil 
society-state alliances deepen the subordination of the public sphere and society's 
noneconomic realm to the logic of private transnational capital". Thus there is an 
agreement that the new politics does serve to enhance international competitiveness, but 
it is debatable at what price this comes and whether or not it truly represents a step 
forward. 
The conceptual and theoretical innovations of neostructuralism have been met 
with skepticism by some associated with the Critical Development School. They argue 
that a main result of the neostructuralist approach to development is to "implement 
ameliorative measures". These measures serve to disarm and co-opt the more radical 
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social movements that have grown in recent years. The new politics subsumes basic 
demands for a more equitable distribution of income and better political representation 
(concrete demands) with a new subjectivity, where identity politics and cosmetic changes 
speak to these concerns but leave the core of the capitalist restructuring project intact. 
They see neostructuralism as basically stabilizing an in danger development model, and 
can thus be seen as a logic next step in the process of capitalist restructuring in the region. 
For these reasons, they label the new neostructuralist informed governments as 
"pragmatic neoliberals" (Petras and Veltmeyer 2000). 
James Petras argues that while the rhetoric of these new governments speaks to 
fundamental changes in favour of people-centric development, the real significance of the 
neostructuralist policies are far more modest. Petras finds the real divergences from the 
neoliberals are in the details: the fine print of individual contracts, the levels of taxation, 
royalties, rents, joint ventures, technology transfers and directorship representation 
(Petras 2006). In fact, after having been given a free ride for so long, Petras argues that 
the new relationship between capital and state is really only being modernized, that the 
terms under which Latin American states allow foreign TNCs to operate are merely being 
updated to global standards found elsewhere. From this perspective, neostructuralism, 
rather than being visionary and innovative, is really playing a game of catch up after 
years of weakness vise a-vie global capital. 
While some of its critics argue that neostructuralism can be seen as a logical 
extension of neoliberalism, ECLAC argues that neostructuralism can more accurately be 
seen as a logical next incarnation of structuralist thinking. Ricardo Bielschowsky, who 
wrote the official economic history of ECLAC of the last 60 years, argues that 
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neostructuralism maintains the main analytic focus as the earlier structuralism 
(Bielschowsky 1998). Overall, he sees a pragmatic combination of continuity and change 
that has brought the structuralist framework up to date in the new globalization era. He 
states that "throughout its history, ECLAC has maintained the same methodological and 
analytical approach," and that far from being an extension of neoliberalism, it can be seen 
as "alternative and contrary to orthodox macroeconomic and neoliberal thinking on 
resource allocation." The similarities with neoliberalism are more to do with the fact that 
they both exist in the same historical era, that is, they both address similar challenges. 
Neostructuralism was necessarily "continually fine-tuned and interpretations renewed, to 
adapt to new historical contexts." Bielschowsky sees the transformations that 
neostructuralism encompassed that made use of the neoliberal theories as strategically 
necessary given the challenges at hand. The changes "made it possible to build bridges 
with those Latin American and Caribbean governments that had persevered with the 
reforms, without abandoning the original structuralist analytical edifice" (Bielschowsky 
2009). A number of parallels and modifications are traced: "In the structuralist period, 
attention was drawn, among other things, to unfavourable "centre-periphery" relations, 
deterioration of the terms of trade, external imbalance and structural inflation, the import-
substitution dynamic, regional integration and dependency. In contrast, the 
neostructuralist stage highlights ideas relating to unfavourable international engagement 
and asymmetries in the era of globalization, external vulnerability and business cycles, 
open regionalism and the global, regional and national agendas." From this perspective, 
neostructuralism represents a strong continuity with the past, with changes mostly 
associated with the new international and domestic context. The central similarity is seen 
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to be the view that the state is still an essential agent in the development process, and its 
strategic use, beyond its market stabilizing functions, are necessary to tackle social 
problems and promote development. 
While ECLAC and Bielschowsky see a fundamental continuity between 
neostructuralism and structuralism, Leiva argues that the most important contributions of 
the structuralist tradition have been abandoned. Fernando Leiva's Latin American 
Neostructuralism: Contradictions of Post-Neoliberal Development (Leiva 2009) is the 
most up to date and insightful critical analysis of the neostructuralist paradigm, and his 
analysis serves as the point of departure for this study. Leiva uses an innovative 
methodology to analyze neostructuralism that goes beyond the received literature that 
focuses on "extended comparison of policy dichotomies (short-term versus long-term, 
markets versus institutions, export-promotion, etc.) [The existing literature] rarely 
investigates the modes through which these contending claims are produced." Leiva 
instead uses a hybrid approach, which combines a critical political economy with a 
discourse analysis. This allows him to peel back neostructuralism's "imposing tapestry" 
and determine how the paradigm constructs concept-meanings. This represents a leap 
forward in paradigmatic "theoretical self-awareness." This methodology allows Leiva to 
determine the meaning of neostructuralism, not just at the discursive level, but as it 
relates to existing social power. 
Leiva finds that neostructuralism represents a break with the structuralist past, 
insofar as it marginalizes power relations from the analysis of the region's political 
economy. His principal argument of the relationship between neostructuralism and 
structuralism is that: "By renouncing to structuralism's methodological legacy—namely a 
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focus on how economic surplus is produced, appropriated, and distributed within a single, 
world capitalist economy—Latin American neostructuralism becomes analytically 
impotent in adequately explicating the scope of the qualitative transformations 
experienced by Latin American capitalism over the past decade." He sees 
neostructuralism as shifting the focus away from this key developmental variable to its 
own detriment. "Rather than redrawing property rights or redistributing the economic 
surplus, this framework displaces the centre of gravity of policy intervention from 
economics to the realm of subjectivity, symbolic politics, and the cultural dimension." 
Thus, contrary to its stated objectives, once neostructuralism interfaces with existing 
social power, it leads to "the politico-economic consolidation, legitimization, and 
furtherance of the process of capitalist restructuring initially set in motion by neoliberal 
ideas and policies." Leiva sees structuralisms original insights as now more necessary 
than ever, making their rejection all the more tragic. 
The neostructuralist synthesis at times represents a confusing combination of 
concepts, theories, models and policies. Yet we study it, because "despite the 
shortcomings of neostructuralism it is the only feasible and credible alternative to 
neoliberalism in present historical circumstances—at least for the time being" (Gwynne 
and Kay 2004). It is often the case that the leader of the pack catches most of the flack, 
for necessary and beneficial reasons. We must be careful not to passively accept 
neostructuralism's innovations, even if they represent a welcome break from the past. 
The critical discussion of neostructuralism may benefit the paradigm itself, as it is 
accepted that neostructuralism is a paradigm under continual reformulation and 
refinement. 
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Methodology and Analytic Framework 
This study makes use of four main methodological strands to shed new light on the 
problem and advance the literature on the topic. First, the analytic framework used to 
situate the question and thus reveal key issues to address is a critical political economy. 
Development policy comes about through political channels, and has far reaching 
economic consequences. Furthermore, the political actors that control the implementation 
of development policy often have economic stakes in the outcomes themselves. The 
critical component is necessary because development issues are intimately conditioned by 
power relations, and a normative acceptance of developmental discourse would not allow 
us to peel back, as Leiva quotes, neostructuralism's "imposing tapestry" to reveal the 
hidden interests, agendas, and powers with which neostructuralism is involved. 
The first major methodological component of the study is a discourse / policy 
analysis. ECLAC has produced a number of 'institutional books' since 1990 that outline 
the basics of the neostructuralist paradigm. Every year or two a new book covers a new 
topic, and these collectively give a sense of the official ECLAC thinking and its changes 
over time. This study will focus on these institutional books, not only focusing on what 
is talked about, but how they go about framing problems, how recommended policies are 
justified, and what is not talked about. 
The study will also draw upon insights gained by the authors attending of the 
annual ECLAC summer school on Latin American economies 2009. This two month 
summer school, run by the ECLAC Division de Desarrollo Productivo y Empresarial 
(DDPE), covered all aspects of ECLAC thinking, including many lessons on the history 
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of ECLAC and changes in its thinking about development issues. This component was 
especially useful to see how ECLAC frames development problems, that is, their own 
methodologies. While most of the policies they talked about were already known from 
the institutional books, the time spent at ECLAC helped to reveal how decision making 
processes happen, how problems are framed, and how ECLAC goes about solving them. 
The final component of the methodology was composed of informal interviews 
with ECLAC division managers. While attending the summer school, the author spoke 
with several prominent neostructuralist thinkers. These conversations supplemented the 
official ECLAC publications with more candid admissions of the limits to the 
neostructuralist paradigm. These conversations contributed to an understanding of the 
institutional limits that ECLAC must adhere to, and how the authors felt about the 
reasons for the movement from structuralism to neostructuralism, which often differed 
considerably from official ECLAC statements. 
Thesis Statement 
The thesis and main finding of this study is that neostructuralism is structuralist in 
essence, and neoliberal in form. That is to say, neostructuralism maintains the essential 
structuralist vision of the agency of the state in the development process, but tempers this 
enthusiasm by making use of neoclassical tools to measure the costs of these actions, thus 
creating a balance. The advantages of structuralist inspired interventions are weighed 
against the costs that neoclassical economics can measure, thus creating an optimal 
amount of state intervention. This is not to say that neostructuralism can be equated with 
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neoliberalism. Neostructuralism accepts the neoliberal critique of the state but holds out 
a strategic role for it to play that goes beyond the neoliberal focus of security, private 
property rights, and basic regulations. Neostructuralism actually proposes that the state 
take a strategic role to alter the productive structure in ways that promote their objectives 
of growth with equity. It is argued that neostructuralism is neoliberal in form, because 
neostructuralism attempts to achieve these objectives through neoliberal associated 
neoclassical economics, while almost always achieving its goals not by direct statist 
development initiatives, but rather by state supported market development. 
Even so, while many of the state interventions that neostructuralism proposes 
seem at first glance to be structuralist in nature, many are more alike to neoliberalism. 
The overwhelming majority of state interventions into market affairs occur with the aim 
to support market based development. They correct market failures, support market-
regulating institutions, and extend market regulating principles beyond the economic 
realm to the rest of society. When designing these interventions, they use modified 
neoclassical methods to find optimal conditions for intervention, with careful attention to 
the political consequences of market distortions. With the inherent instability of 
neoliberal political economies becoming apparent, the neostructural 'reforms to the 
reforms' clearly had the effect of stabilizing and consolidating the market based model. 
However, the essence of the neostructuralist development strategy shares with 
structuralism a belief that it is both desirable and practical to purposefully orient the 
entire productive structure, in this case, towards the world market. While neoliberalism is 
often associated with outward oriented development, to be precise, this is only a result of 
the natural reorientation of the productive structure due to market signals. Neoliberalism, 
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on the contrary, does not believe that the state should, or can in a sustainable and efficient 
way, interfere with the overall productive orientation. Although structuralism 
purposefully oriented the structure inwards, and neostructuralism outwards, they share 
the same main belief that the state can and should orient it one way or another. This 
aspect of neostructuralism is the least justified. It is one thing to argue for the state to 
correct for market failures that can be defined and overcome in an efficient manner, but it 
is quite another to suggest that the state should decide how the entire productive structure 
should be oriented. Slightly broadened neoclassical tools are used to justify the correction 
for market failures, but no consistent explanation is offered to justify the intervention into 
the overall productive orientation. In contrast, one wonders how neostructuralism did not 
learn from the mistakes of structuralism. After promoting inward oriented development 
for so long, and having that turn out to be unsustainable, it is surprising that the 
neostructuralists turn around and argue for an outward orientation. 
The theoretical innovations involved regarding social cohesion are the most 
original, not finding clear predecessors in either structuralism or neoliberalism. The drive 
for a collective effort to support the development strategy is sympathetic to neoliberal 
concerns for personal liberties, as participation is made strictly voluntary. Yet at the same 
time, the need for social solidarity, and the benefits of collective action harkens back to 
structuralist ideas of the importance of equity as a basis for development. 
The main contradiction that neostructuralism produces is undoubtedly the 
"heterodox paradox" (Leiva 2009). While neostructuralism explicitly argues that 
economic objectives must become subordinated to social objectives, the effect of the 
drive for a consensus on the strategy has the opposite effect; the social realm becomes 
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increasingly subservient and dominated by the logic of the most powerful transnational 
economic forces. Neostructuralism suffers from a kind of 'mission creep'. Whereas the 
strategy begins with a humble effort to restore growth and promote its equitable 
distribution, over time it has grown to demand that all manner of social behaviour to be 
geared to support this objective. In effect, the neostructuralist vision comes to serve an 
example of what life would be like if economists ruled the world. 
Structure of the Argument 
The analysis begins in Chapter Two by uncovering the main ideas, policy 
recommendations, and developmental outcomes of both of neostructuralism's 
paradigmatic predecessors. It has become common to divide Latin America's recent 
history of economic development into two phases: the first dominated by structuralist 
ideas, often called inward-oriented development, and a second neoliberal period, with an 
outward orientation. This analysis will allow us to relate neostructuralism to structuralism 
and neoliberalism, regarding its main ideas and policy proposals. Secondly, this chapter 
will serve to provide the historical context for the emergence of neostructuralism after the 
decline of neoliberalism in the 1990s. This context will demonstrate the historical 
momentum that thrust neostructuralism to the forefront of the development debate. From 
the historical perspective, it becomes clear that the essence of structuralism, 
neoliberalism, and neostructuralism need to be considered in context of the development 
situation in which they operated. The similarities and differences between are not always 
27 
visible on the face of their policies, but how these policies related to the actual existing 
situations in Latin America that they were addressing. 
Once the context for the emergence of neostructuralism is established, Chapter 
Three will discuss the reformulations that ECLAC underwent in the 1980s, culminating 
in the new paradigmatic synthesis. Neostructuralism went through a kind of learning 
process, where both the valuable insights and faults of the previous paradigms were 
acknowledged. The core neostructuralist concepts, theories, and models are deconstructed 
to reveal how neostructuralism combines seemingly contradictory elements into a unified 
development strategy. Special attention will be paid to the neostructuralist formulation of 
the role of the state in the development process. Neostructuralists see a key role for the 
state, however they recognize the limitations and dangers of state interventions, and 
accordingly integrate a number of checks and balances to these proposals. The analysis 
will carefully examine the justification of these interventions and reveal their theoretical 
basis. 
Chapter Four will look at the integrated policy framework that accompanies the 
neostructuralist development strategy. Not only does the policy framework cover 
macroeconomic, productive development, social, and international policy dimensions, it 
does so in an integrated way where each component works towards the achievement of 
the overall strategy. The integrated policy framework is the clearest insight into the real 
meaning of neostructuralism, as it lays bare the policy and the practical meaning of the 
paradigm. The policy recommendations are combined with a discussion of the unique 
mode of regulation that neostructuralism employs. This mode of regulation makes it clear 
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that neostructuralism makes use of modes of social coordination that go beyond market 
signals to include voluntary trust and solidarity based networks. 
The paradigmatic synthesis does make use of a number of valuable innovations, 
however, as a result of omissions and inconsistencies, it also produces a number of 
contradictions. Chapter Five examines neostructuralism on a theoretical and policy level, 
to determine what is not talked about, and what is not sufficiently justified. Overall, 
Leiva's thesis is confirmed, that neostructuralism avoids any discussion of the influence 
of power in the development process, and the obstacles to development that certain 
powers are posing. The strategy is excessively cooperative, looking for common ground 
wherever it can, but it fails to recognize the sometimes unfortunately necessity of 
conflict. The reality of contemporary Latin American capitalism, in the context of 
extreme income inequality, means that now more than ever power relations are at the 
heart of the developmental problems. In some cases, it can be argued that when looked at 
from how neostructuralism interfaces with existing social power, it even serves to support 
these anti-developmentalist powers. Certain reforms that should be front and centre in the 
paradigm are found completely missing or underdeveloped, because of the opposition 
that some powers pose to them. 
There is no doubt that neostructuralism is a major step forward for the region in 
thinking and practice of development. Nevertheless, it is not enough. The social unity in 
support of the strategy needs to be tempered against the necessity to dissent, and oppose 
trends that benefit some at the expense of others. This need should carry over into the 
political realm - voters should balance the gains that compromise and concertation give 
with their own long-term strategies to work for the highest, uncompromised goods of 
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freedom and social justice. The study concludes with a brief conclusion, expanding upon 
some of the main conclusions, and suggests new areas of research. 
Chapter 2 
Historicizing Neostructuralism 
The analysis will begin with a long-term historical image of Latin America that will help 
to frame the momentum of development progress in Latin America. Latin America has 
undergone a remarkable transformation in the last century, yet certain patterns remain 
intact. The historical review will focus on the nexus of three interrelated currents: 
development strategies; the policy making dynamic; and development outcomes. This 
historical review after 1945 will focus on the emergence and evolution of two major 
development paradigms that were the precursors to neostructuralism: structuralism and 
neoliberalism. While neither paradigm could be said to have been truly implemented in 
practice, they nonetheless have served as important ideational pulls for development 
policy making. 
Structuralism, which emphasized the importance of state planning and intentional 
industrialization, was influential in the early post-war years, coinciding with the era of 
inward looking development, from 1930-1980. The reasons for its rise, the mechanics of 
the industrialization process, and its exhaustion in the 1970s will be examined. 
Neoliberalism, focusing on individual initiative as a motor force for development and 
market directed economics, grew in part because of the problems associated with the 
development model, and was an important ideational pull from the 1970s onwards. The 
analysis will show how these development paradigms have risen to influence and 
declined in policy making in Latin America. Policy makers learn from past mistakes, find 
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boundaries, while certain ideas gestate in the long term. This will give a historical sense 
of the developmental momentum when neostructuralism emerged. 
Finally, the chapter will conclude with an outline of the historical development 
moment in which neostructuralism appeared: its germination during the debt crisis of the 
1980s, its emergence during the height of neoliberalism's influence, and its rise to 
prominence as the neoliberal ideal was no longer seen as a useful. How exactly did 
policy makers come to accept the superiority of the neostructural paradigm over the 
previous neoliberal one? What function did the neostructural paradigm serve in the 
context of the maturation of the new economic order? These questions will be focused on 
as the analysis moves through the long-term, high-level sweep of Latin America's 
developmental history. 
Early Economic Development 
Early economic development in Latin America was slow and turbulent. Contact with 
Europe and the United States allowed Latin America to take advantage of imported 
knowledge and technology that fueled its development. However, Latin America's 
comparatively weak power in the international arena meant it would have to guard 
against international powers from conditioning Latin America's economic system to 
serve foreign interests. 
During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Latin America increasingly 
integrated into the British-led free trade imperial economic system (O'Brien 1997). 
Economic policy was dictated by the short-term needs of the ruling oligarchies, and not 
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by any coherent strategy. Development was fueled by the export of unprocessed 
commodities and the importation of advanced manufactures (Weaver 2000). Imported 
transportation technologies were especially beneficial, as railroads linked the interior of 
the continent to the ports, and steamships provided a cheaper and faster means of 
reaching foreign markets. While some success was had in reducing institutional and other 
barriers to trade, up until the 1930s, the Latin American region remained the most 
protected in the world (Coatsworth 2005). 
Different economic activities with similar outputs had markedly different 
economic consequences. Some activities, such as the production of guano in Peru, 
typifying a natural resource enclave economy, had little dynamic consequences in the rest 
of the economy. By contrast, the pampas economy in Argentina had much stronger 
forward linkages, with firms centred in the port city of Buenos Aires milling the wheat, 
slaughtering the animals, and packing, storing, and loading the goods on ships (Alejandro 
1970). Throughout the export led era, Latin America experienced some economic growth 
and improvements in social indicators of welfare. Even so, this period also brought a 
large increase in inequality, owing largely to the vast giveaways of land to the politically 
well connected, at the expense of indigenous and peasant people. 
Latin American institutions that facilitated these activities were woefully 
underdeveloped. Institutional legacies included unpredictable and biased judiciaries, 
uncertain property-rights enforcement, high political risk, and economic barriers that 
blocked the participation of potential entrepreneurs (Dye 2006). The persistence of 
institutional formations over time suggest that the practices that emerged during the 
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colonial era set Latin America on a "path dependence" that tended to reinforce historical 
inequalities (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002). 
The period from 1914 to 1945 has been described as one of dislocation and 
experiment (Thorp 1998). Several shocks of various types resulted in a slow shift away 
from exports and towards industry as the focus of economic dynamism. The Great 
Depression is often taken as the key event that marked the demise of the export led 
growth model. The collapse of world trade made clear how unreliable it was to rely so 
heavily on external markets for essential goods. At the same time, new social demands 
and political actors emerged for better wages and working conditions, coming from the 
growing middle and working classes, tied to the banking, merchandizing, and social 
infrastructure sectors. As a consequence, the ruling oligarchies were widely displaced by 
nationalist-populist regimes favouring industrialization. The first major moves toward 
strategic industrialization began during this time, with the state becoming more willing to 
participate in economic affairs. However, as the early forms of industrialization that 
emerged after the Great Depression were byproducts of the deficient functioning of the 
international economic system, they were a "sub-optimal solution" (Cardenas, Ocampo et 
al. 2000). These developments were closely associated with the rise of the Keynesian 
interventionist state and the 'New Deal' in the US. After the great depression in the US, a 
welfare state was constructed, while the state grew to manage economic arrangements 
with the power to both discipline capital and labour. 
The Structuralist Paradigm and Inward Oriented Development 
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In the early post-war years, a democratic wave swept Latin America, bringing with it 
high hopes of economic development and political inclusiveness. Owing to their 
independent nation-state status, the Latin American republics played an important role in 
the creation of the United Nations system. In 1948, the UN established ECLAC, to act as 
a clearinghouse of information, analysis, and policy advice to member governments. As 
executive secretary of ECLAC from 1950, Raul Prebisch was central in the formulation 
of ECLAC's analytic framework and policy orientation, constituting a development 
paradigm later labeled Latin American structuralism. This structuralist paradigm emerged 
during a period of lively investigation into issues of underdevelopment, and the growth of 
a distinctly heterodox approach to development economics, such as those by Singer, 
Nurkse, Lewis, and Rosenstein-Rodan. 
The analytic approach that Prebisch pioneered to studying Latin American 
underdevelopment was historical-structural. This approach understands the problems 
facing Latin America as a series of blockages resulting from the particular inherited 
cultural, social, and institutional circumstances of each country. This approach was non-
orthodox at the time, as Prebisch felt that while received theory provided some useful 
tools, this general knowledge had to be re-invented locally to provide effective solutions 
(Bielschowsky 1998). 
The basis of the structural paradigm was an understanding of the history and 
dynamics of the development of the entire world economy, and Latin America's 
particular position and insertion within it. The operating unit of structuralism was the 
'system', in this case, Latin America as a component part of the world capitalist 
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economy. This was a break from prevailing neoclassical orthodoxy at the time, which 
focused on the'individual'. 
Prebisch hypothesized the division of the world economy as having an industrial 
centre and a largely agrarian periphery. These regions were linked by a process of 
unequal exchange, whose dynamics were detrimental to the development of the 
periphery. A high demand growth for industrial goods of the centre was contrasted 
against a low demand growth for primary goods of the peripheral areas. This imbalance 
would necessarily lead to balance of payments difficulties and foreign exchange 
shortages in the periphery. This imbalance was made worse by a hypothesized secular 
deterioration in the terms of trade between primary and industrial goods. Within this 
world economic system of unequal exchange, the structuralists aimed to understand how 
economic surpluses were generated by export activities only to be transferred overseas 
back to the centre, or used up for luxury consumption in the periphery. 
Within Latin America, the structuralists advanced the concept of structural 
heterogeneity. This heterogeneity has come to be understood as having many dimensions. 
The dynamic worked against labour, as a slow growth in demand resulted from a sluggish 
investment ratio, compounded by the tendency for production methods to be capital 
intensive in a context of an abundance of labour (Bielschowsky 2009). It was also noticed 
that high productivity sectors could exist side-by-side with very low productivity sectors, 
while lack of forward linkages prevented productivity gains to be transferred between 
them. These problems were made worse by an institutional framework unable to promote 
investment or support technical progress. Finally, much of Latin America was 
characterized by non-capitalist and colonial era structures that behaved entirely 
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differently than regularized markets would, meaning that received wisdom and their 
assumptions often did not apply. 
From this basic analytic framework, the structuralists believed that while market 
forces were a good starting point to allocate resources, they were not enough. The 
particular historical-structural conditions in Latin America meant a different kind of state 
was necessary than that which was suited to the centre economies. The strategy saw a 
central role for the state in planning the economy in order to break out of a self-
reinforcing cycle of underdevelopment. In many cases the existence of acute blockages to 
development meant that specific state interventions to correct them could bring more 
benefits than the costs associated with the interventions. The state was to adopt a 
comprehensive development strategy, whose principal aim was to promote a domestic 
industrialization process. It was to create an endogenous growth engine that could 
generate and assimilate technical progress. The state was to provide for a more strategic 
engagement with the global economy by modifying the exchange rate, providing 
protective tariffs, and restricting foreign direct investment. Specific industrial policies 
were to be used to foster the absorption of technical progress and its diffusion throughout 
the economy. The state was to allocate significant shares of economic resources, by 
capturing rents from exports and agriculture, and redirecting them towards industry. 
Income redistribution policies, a land tax, and agrarian reform were seen as essential to 
overcome obstacles to the deepening of the industrial process and improving efficiency 
and equity. Institutional, financial, agrarian, and fiscal reforms were added to the policy 
agenda, in an aim to deepen and broaden the drive for productive development. 
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Economic Policy Making 
Development strategy was one key aspect of post-war economic policy making, but by no 
means was the structuralist paradigm absolutely followed. The structuralist thinkers at 
ECLAC served to provide a theoretical basis for state planning, while rationalizing the 
process already underway. 
Economic policy making during the post war years was discontinuous and caught 
between polarizing forces. Populists in favour of a deepened industrialization, more 
structural intervention, and progressive redistribution, found themselves in opposition 
from the domestic upper classes as well as by the United States' empire (Halperin 2008). 
The Cuban revolution in 1959 proved a powerful ideational influence in Latin America in 
favour of revolutionary state planned economies. More radical streams of structuralism 
such as dependency theory emerged, which emphasized the negative aspects of 
international trade and favoured socialist revolution. Authoritarian tendencies countered 
by suppressing popular demands, and in doing so maintained or exacerbated income 
inequalities, further fueling the flames of populism. It proved quite difficult to reach a 
middle ground between these extremes, and moves toward some policies, such as income 
redistribution, were never successfully implemented. The instability that this dynamic 
produced invited foreign intervention by the US, which favoured authoritarian regimes as 
predictable allies. The US supported Alliance for Progress economic development project 
was designed to offer an alternative to the Cuban model and keep Latin American 
developments on a course that served US strategic and commercial interests. 
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Nevertheless, throughout most of Latin America, Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI) emerged as a concise development strategy, especially in the 
medium and larger republics. The objective of ISI was to produce domestic industrial 
products that were previously imported. The ISI model was to progress through 
successive stages, from the substitution of simple consumer goods, to durables, and 
finally to capital goods (Love 2005). Four main factors determined the course of the 
emergence of this industrial policy: the disruptions caused by wars; balance of payments 
difficulties; growth of the domestic market; and official development policy (Hirschman 
1968). The principal policy instruments used to promote ISI were the following: 
protective tariff and/or exchange controls; special preference for domestic and foreign 
firms importing capital goods for new industries; preferential import exchange rates for 
industrial raw materials, fuels and intermediate goods; cheap loans by government 
development banks for favoured industries; the construction by governments of 
infrastructures designed to complement industries; and the direct participation of 
government in certain industries, especially heavy industries such as steel in which 
neither domestic or foreign private capital was willing to invest (Baer 1972). 
Performance of Inward Oriented Development 
Overall, in both large and small republics, the inward oriented development era coincided 
with a rapid economic growth. From 1945-73, Latin America's GDP grew by an average 
of 5.3 percent per year, while productivity (output per capita) grew at 3 percent per year. 
This economic expansion brought with it impressive progress in social indicators of 
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welfare as well. A study by Astorga et Al. (2003) shows that Latin Americans improved 
their standard of living the fastest during the period from 1940-1980. The middle class 
expanded, facilitating better investments in public utilities and other infrastructure. The 
service sector expanded, which met the demands of the growing formal sector and 
businessmen. The rapid industrialization also facilitated learning by managers and 
workers, accelerating productivity gains and introducing new ways of organizing 
production (Bruton 1989). 
By the late 1960s, however, the industrialization program ran into serious 
problems. Policy makers were unable to adjust policies rapidly enough to changing 
circumstances, while certain desired policies were not able to be implemented due to 
political opposition and entrenched interests. During the inward oriented phase, domestic 
markets did expand and industrialization took place, but external dependence remained 
high, in technology, production, and ownership patterns (Sunkel 1993). The process also 
failed to generate an endogenous entrepreneurial class for dynamic expansion. Latin 
America also failed to progress, as East Asia was doing, from IS I for the domestic market 
to production for the external market. Multinational branch plants were not drawn to 
Latin America not for their ability to compete in the international market, but rather to 
extract monopoly rents from protected markets. Tariff levels were allowed to rise, as the 
people most affected by them - consumers - had little political voice. The tariffs built up 
in a manner so that each balance of payment crisis brought successively higher levels of 
protection in a process that built up "geologically" (Cardenas, Ocampo et al. 2000). As a 
consequence, grossly inefficient firms arose, that were highly uncompetitive from the 
standpoint of world markets. 
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The structuralists were aware of many of these deficiencies and they tried to 
address them in modified recommendations, though they were not enough. Nevertheless, 
the longstanding export pessimism began to wane in the 1970s, owing partially to a 
increase in Latin America's NBTT between 1970 and 1980 (Ocampo and Parra 2003). 
An export promotion strategy that the structuralists developed involved grafting onto the 
already existing ISI framework a set of initiatives designed to increase the profitability of 
manufactured exports. While the promotion of exports did raise the share of 
manufactures in exports, it was unable to increase total exports sufficient to provide a 
new dynamic growth centre. Most of the medium and smaller sized countries in the 
Andes and Central America chose to develop their primary product export sectors. The 
desire to capture increasing shares of the booming export revenues led to several 
nationalizations of strategic exporting sectors, especially oil in Bolivia, Venezuela and 
Ecuador. However, simultaneous increases in imports during this period more than offset 
the rise in exports after 1975, maintaining a precarious balance of payments situation, 
which in non-oil exporters after 1973 resulted in persistent macroeconomic vulnerability. 
Even with the faults that were undermining the vitality of economic development, 
Latin America continued to exhibit progress in the 1970s. There were persistent increases 
in social welfare, wages, infrastructure, and education. The problems of the system were 
masked by an abundant access to cheap international credit, so that as macroeconomic 
imbalances grew and inflation accelerated, there was little incentive to correct them. 
Given the abundance of foreign financing at this time the problems could have been 
much more effectively addressed. Given this lost opportunity, Sunkel has long argued 
that the 1970s was the true lost decade for development. In light of this failure to adjust, 
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some of the problems that the development model was manifesting became increasingly 
the target of well-aimed criticism from a resurgent neoliberal approach to development, 
not just in Latin America but throughout the world. 
The Neoliberal Paradigm and Outward Oriented Development 
The 1970s marked an important turning point in thinking about development economics, 
both in the developed and developing world. The focus on free trade between nations was 
undoubtedly influenced by the decades of stability after the war had ended. As well, the 
return of neoclassical economics provided economists with ever more precise ways of 
framing economic problems and suggesting where to look for solutions. Neoclassical 
economics never disappeared during the post war decades in Latin America. Beginning in 
the late 1960s, these neoclassical perspectives were enriched by an increased formality, 
comparability, and statistical rigor - a long over due and necessary adjustment to its 19th 
century methodologies (Krugman 1997). 
The neoclassical analysis provided a means to quantify the costs associated with 
state interventions and economic planning. These insights were used by a growing 
neoliberal paradigm to argue for a radically different development strategy. Neoliberal 
development theory holds that the 'individual', not the 'system' as in structuralism, is the 
key analytic unit. Individuals, aggregated into markets, would provide the most optimal 
allocation of economic resources. Neoclassical economics is based on the aggregation of 
individual economic agents and firms, from the premise that individuals try to maximize 
utility, and firms try to maximize profit. While historical obstacles to development may 
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exist, neoliberalism holds that these kinds of obstacles are best overcome by creative 
individual initiative. Historically inherited inequalities, even if grossly unfair, were best 
remedied not by coercive redistribution, but by unleashing the power of each individual 
to develop themselves. Neoliberals thus favoured free trade, private initiative, and very 
little economic intervention by the state. Neoliberals argued that the state should be 
limited to providing security, upholding the enforcement of contracts, maintaining a 
system of jurisprudence, and the provision of a limited amount of public goods that met 
the strict requirements of a public welfare function (Friedman 1962). Neoliberals saw 
wider state interventionism as well-intentioned, but ultimately counterproductive. The 
recommendations of the neoliberals were two-fold. On the one hand they favoured the 
dismantling of the state planning apparatus in order to reduce economic distortions, while 
on the other they supported the strengthening and extension of private property rights. 
The neoliberal school was increasingly vocal in its criticisms of the prevailing 
economic development strategies in Latin America beginning around 1970 (I.M.D. Little 
1970). The basis of these critiques of the structuralist economic paradigm was that the 
autarkic promotion of industrialization prevented each country from achieving its 
maximum comparative advantage in world markets. They added that in the Latin 
American context of underdeveloped institutions and relatively weak policy planning 
abilities, the state was especially unable to have the required information or incentive to 
allocate resources efficiently. Thus, the overvalued exchange rates which normally 
accompanied the industrialization programs would serve to unjustly punish exports and 
agriculture. Multiple exchange rate mechanisms designed to favour certain types of 
imports would encourage speculative and unproductive behaviour. 
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The rapid expansion of the East Asian economies during this time underlined, 
from the neoliberal point of view, how important exports were to growth. However, it 
would be more precise to say that the neoclassical economists only supported exports 
indirectly. They believed the growth of exports would be a natural evolution of the 
withdrawal of state from the economy. Similarly, they did not argue for primary 
commodities production explicitly, but rather, left unto its own, the market would decide 
what to produce. Thus, some of the key questions occupying structuralist development 
theories, concerning the level of industrialization or the correct exchange rate, were seen 
as missing the point by the neoliberals. By the mid 1970s, the neoliberal social 
philosophy and the neoclassical economics that it employed began to inspire radical 
restructuring projects in favour of marketization. 
Early market oriented reformers 
Latin America generally attempted half-hazard export promotion schemes in the 1970s, 
but it was in the southern cone that a more comprehensive project was attempted. This 
first wave of neoliberal inspired restructuring occurred at a time when highly repressive 
military governments ruled the region. The emphasis on freedom in the economic sphere 
was thus combined with authoritarianism in the political sphere. 
The policy reversals in Chile under the Pinochet dictatorship were the most 
dramatic in Latin America at the time. A group of economists known as the 'Chicago 
boys', who had trained under Milton Freedman and Arnold Harberger at the University of 
Chicago, agitated for a profound neoliberal overhaul. By the late 1970s, the Chicago 
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boys had taken over key economic policy positions within the government, and from that 
base, they launched their free-market revolution. 
Tariffs were reduced to an average of 10 percent by 1979, coming down from 
over 100 percent in 1973. Public spending was reduced to one-half its 1973 level by GDP 
(O'Brien and Roddick 1983). Almost all of the nationalizations that occurred during the 
Allende period were reversed, and some privatizations of even more longstanding 
strategic sectors took place, with the exception of the large national copper company. 
Prices were freed and the banking system and financial markets were deregulated. A new 
pro-business labour code was established and social security was privatized. 
Macroeconomic management was distinctly monetarist, with inflation being managed by 
demand management and a contraction of the money supply. These reform measures 
were also undertaken, although to a markedly lesser degree, in Argentina and Uruguay 
under their own dictatorships, as well as in Peru after the transition to civilian rule in 
1978. 
After some initial economic growth and a fall in the inflation rate, these early 
reformers succumbed to economic crises along with the rest of Latin America in the early 
1980s. In fact, the debt crisis hit these countries especially hard, with Chile's GDP falling 
by 14 percent in one year. The rapid and un-sequenced financial liberalization created 
distortions that resulted in financial panic when the inflows of capital of the late 1970s 
were reversed in the early 1980s (Ffrench-Davis 2002). The period of radical market 
oriented reforms also brought a more pronounced concentration of wealth, as capital was 
better positioned to take advantage of the new arrangements, whereas organized labour 
was repressed and was disproportionately forced to bear the burdens of adjustment. 
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These early reformers were unusual in that they preceded the major shift in the 
developed countries towards neoliberalism. The global neoliberal shift was used as way 
to restructure out of a profitability crisis that was manifest in the capitalist core countries. 
By making use of the widely popular ideology of freedom, the project aimed to restore 
primacy of finance over production, secure conditions for the penetration of developing 
world markets and counter their demands for a more democratic world order, reestablish 
the dominance of capital over labour, and to dismantle costly elements of welfare state. 
This global restructuring project found political expression in UK and US in 
neoconservative governments, and the trigger was pulled in 1979 by the US Federal 
Reserve, which precipitated a worldwide recession, and thus provided for a chaotic 
environment that was more amendable to be reorganized along the new order (Harvey 
2003). Latin America was eventually swept along in this new tide, and did so from a very 
disadvantageous position. 
The Debt Crisis, Stabilization and Adjustment 
The key turning point in Latin America's economic development, often taken as the 
transition point between inward and outward oriented development, was the outbreak of 
the debt crisis in 1982. The debt crisis was generalized, with nearly all countries of Latin 
America finding themselves having major difficulty servicing their external US Dollar 
debts, regardless of previous policy orientation. Essentially, the crisis resulted from a 
crisis of over-borrowing, made all the more dangerous by the ability of the US Federal 
Reserve to exert monopoly control over the interest rates and availability of new credit. 
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Throughout the 1970s the external debt of Latin America grew, especially by the 
big three borrowers, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. They were incentivized to borrow by 
the artificially low interest rates set by the US Federal Reserve. When interest rates 
spiked after 1979, the US and world economy were thrown into a deep recession. The 
demand for Latin America's exports plummeted, and the terms of trade turned against 
them, exacerbating balance of payments difficulties. International lenders expressed pro-
cyclical behaviour, so that just when Latin America needed new loans the most, banks 
were unwilling to lend. This combined with a massive capital flight in 1981-82, meant it 
was increasingly difficult to service the debt. 
The debt crisis triggered a decade of economic chaos in the region, with 
unprecedented socioeconomic setbacks, and a very slow and difficult adjustment. The 
immediate challenge was external adjustment, that is, a correction in the balance of 
payments and the generation of a massive trade surplus in order to service the debt. 
Linked with the challenge of external adjustment, was internal stabilization, that is, the 
control of runaway inflation. These challenges were to be tackled in the context of major 
macroeconomic uncertainty, and a massive outflow of resources (Ramos 1993). 
By 1983 three-quarters of Latin American countries were then under IMF 
agreements, all of which were of the "upper credit tranche" involving a high degree of 
conditionality. The IMF demanded policies that were essentially geared with the singular 
objective of liberating funds in order to maintain debt service payments. The dominant 
adjustments that the Fund required were the following: a devaluation of the currency, the 
reduction of the fiscal deficit, the promotion of a trade surplus, and the liberalization of 
prices, except the price of labour, which was fixed by a public sector wage freeze. The 
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IMF's orthodox stabilization program was thus inherently contractionary, as only through 
the destruction of demand could the trade balance improve. The overall effect of this 
austerity in the midst of the recession was strongly pro-cyclical, which severely 
jeopardized long-term investment and growth. Governments resorted to printing money 
to meet shortfalls, thus causing rampant inflation, which from 1982 to 1988 averaged 240 
percent. 
A few heterodox stabilization programs were attempted, with the goal to restore 
balance without provoking a major recession. These programs combined demand 
management policies with supply strategies that were to shift resources from non-tradable 
to tradables. Price controls were to guide expectations, providing a buffer while new 
income streams came online. After some initial success, these programs failed in their 
objectives and in some cases aggravated the crises. By the end of the 1980s, there was 
still no clear resolution to the debt crisis, and macroeconomic volatility persisted. 
Democratization and the New Economic Model 
The adjustment and stabilization programs were occurring in a context of the return of 
civilian rule to the region after decades of widespread military governments. While 
grassroots demands were in part the impetus for the transition, it remained a negotiated 
transfer between political, economic, and military elites. During the transition it was 
agreed not to stir up democratic aspirations too much; the new order would be a low 
intensity democracy (Gills, Rocamora et al. 1993). As a result of harsh military 
repression, a widespread atomization of civil society occurred, resulting in a passive 
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conformist attitude, and a radical de-politicization. Popular disenchantment with politics 
did not wane with the return of civilian rule, as they remained distrustful, suspicious of 
corruption, and felt excluded from the process. A sense of insecurity prevailed, and 
violence increased (Munk 1989). The democratization was complicated as demands for 
correcting social injustices met with very little capacity of the state to deliver. 
One solution used by the new governments was to technocratize economic policy 
making (Gwynne and Kay 2004). Specialized economic teams, often foreign trained, 
were seen as essential to ensuring confidence. They served as intermediaries between 
governments and international capital, while insulating politicians from economic 
failures. Economic development became a technical, not political problem. In order to 
further avail the public, a strategy of replacing political participation with consumer 
demands propagated, fueled by a large increase in TV viewership and the 
transnationalization of culture. Liberty to consume replaced political rights, and social 
mobility and personal achievement were contained to the domain of private satisfactions. 
The climate of opinion in Latin America dramatically shifted when the collapse of 
the Soviet Empire undermined for all forms of planned economies. By the early 1990s, 
the "end of history" was declared; liberal free-market democracies had won. Now no 
longer confined to a small group of academic, military and business cliques, the new 
economic model established itself in the mainstream common sense. 
A first comprehensive proposal of what was needed to adjust to the new 
environment arrived in the mid 1980s (Balassa 1986). While this proposal was initially 
not well received, the contours of this market oriented restructuring program were 
outlined in a much more influential document, What Washington Means by Policy 
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Reform (Williamson 1990). Its main policy proposals, the lowest common denominators 
that were being demanded by the Washington based institutions, came to be known as the 
Washington Consensus (WC). The next year, the World Bank weighed in with its 
"market friendly" form of development in its World Development Report (WorldBank 
1991). These ideas formed the basis of the restructuring projects in the direction of 
neoliberalism that were being implemented widely in the region at the time. The 
restructuring project began in 1985 and accelerated at the turn of the 1990s, and was 
centred on three areas: liberalization, deregulation, and privatization. 
The liberalization campaigns focused on three particular markets: foreign trade; 
the financial system; and the labour market. The liberalization of trade was supported by 
a growing body of evidence that found that economies most exposed to international 
trade flows had the highest growth rates. The decline of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to 
trade were dramatic, whereas progress in labour market reform advanced the least. 
Average tariffs fell from around 42% in 1986 to around 21% in 1990, and to roughly 
12% in 1995 (Paus 2004). The new liberalized structure was supposed to move resources 
from the previously capital and import intensive import substituting investments and 
towards sectors involving natural resource exploitation and labour intensive production, 
in accordance with static comparative advantages. The reduction in tariffs would serve to 
shake out uncompetitive import substituting industries, while benefiting consumers with 
lower prices (Dijkstra 2000). 
The deregulation campaign was meant to make it easier for new entrepreneurs to 
open business, thereby unleash the private creative spirit, and increase employment and 
overall productivity of the economy. At a meso-economic level, some re-regulation 
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occurred, as institutions of economic regulation were imbued with market testing 
mechanisms. There was also a drive to break the influence of the government over 
monetary policy, leaving the central bank to set interest rates autonomously. Privatization 
of state owned enterprises was designed to increase firm efficiency, while reducing 
structural distortions resulting from government planning (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes 
2005). The privatization of state assets, which gained momentum in the latter half of the 
1980s, was also a means whereby the state could reduce costs on loss making enterprises, 
while gaining one-time influxes of money that could service the debt, in so called 'debt 
for equity' swaps. 
While the New Economic Model is often viewed in terms of its macroeconomic 
components, the heart of the NEM rests on microeconomic foundations (Reinhardt and 
Peres 2000). Individual economic agents were to allocate resources efficiently, with the 
state limited to setting the rules for the game. Industrial policy almost disappeared 
altogether, with only limited programs for the promotion of credit, and the building of 
strategic scientific and technical infrastructure. 
The economic performance of the reforms has been mixed. Among the most 
significant advances has been in the area of controlling inflation. Owing largely to a large 
reduction and stabilization of fiscal deficits, and a slowdown in the issuance of new 
money, inflation has decreased from an average of 400% during the 1980s to around 10% 
percent by the year 2000. The boughs of hyperinflation have also disappeared, which had 
earlier seen inflation rise to 1200% in 1990, levels very damaging to economic 
development. The reduction of inflation also looks impressive when compared to levels 
during the ISI era of about 20% (Ramos 2000). 
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The era of the NEM has also seen a slight diversification of the production 
structure, especially with regards exports. Export growth has been very rapid, growing at 
about 9% per year in the 1990s. This rate was over four times greater than export growth 
during the ISI era. The export profile has also diversified to incorporate a greater 
percentage of non-traditional exports. The level of traditional exports has fallen from 
75% in 1980 to 50% by 2000. Over the 1990s the proportion of manufactures in exports 
has also increased. 
Even though the NEM has ushered in drastic cuts in social spending, the provision 
of basic infrastructure and public services did improve as well. Poverty rates declines 
slightly from there very high 1980s levels, and this has largely been attributed to 
increases in social spending after 1990. Overall, the region registered some growth from 
1990 to 1994 and in 1996. This growth was an important contributor to the consolidation 
of the reform agenda. However, this growth has since been shown to be a result of the 
large capital inflows that returned to the region, rather than as a result of the reforms 
themselves. Indeed, even proponents of the NEM admit that the actual growth effects of 
the reforms so far implemented have been disappointing. 
Contrasting with rapid growth in exports and modest economic growth, the NEM 
has been associated with poor productivity growth (Rozenwurcel 2006). Labour 
productivity grew at rates much slower than during the ISI period. The reforms also had a 
negative impact on the distribution of income (Peres and Stallings 2000). Investment 
ratios still remain below their 1970s levels. The growth of international competitiveness 
of exports has largely been the result of frequent devaluations, rather than increases in 
productivity. The rise in exports is also contrasted against a fall in high technology 
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exports and services, such as engineering, informatics, and telecommunications (ECLAC 
2008). There has been a marked move towards the informalization of the labour force. In 
the agricultural sector after the reforms, production has increased, but employment has 
fallen. The number of small farms has drastically fallen, and inequality in the distribution 
of land and income from agriculture has increased. 
The NEM has also been associated with enormous and growing transfer of real 
assets abroad. Much of this transfer has been a result of debt service. Debt service ratios 
have improved recently, but the quantities remain massive. These transfers are combined 
with increases in royalties, rents, and profit remittances towards foreign-based TNCs 
(Petras and Veltmeyer 2007). As the much sought after foreign direct investment has 
bought up existing assets in Latin America, transfers abroad increase in tandem as the 
restrictions and conditions for the availability of FDI have all but disappeared. Much of 
this FDI has also been used to buy up existing productive capacity, capture shares of 
domestic markets, especially telecommunications and other utilities, rather than for the 
creation of new production. The gains from privatizations, often sold to foreign TNCs, 
did not bring in nearly as much income as they were worth, owing to the rushed nature 
and non-transparent nature of the negotiations. 
The particular combination of trade and financial liberalizations, when combined 
with overvalued exchange rates that were the product of pro-cyclical financial flows, 
meant that most of Latin America experienced a significant deterioration in their external 
accounts during the 1990s (Ocampo and Martin 2003). A large proportion of these 
deficits have been financed by public and private external indebtedness. The increased 
financialization of the economy after the reforms is one of the most salient features of the 
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new economic order. The continual increase in foreign indebtedness and the reliance on 
foreign capital inflows combined to magnify the external vulnerability and financial 
fragility of the region. Sudden stops in capital inflows were able to precipitate major 
financial and currency crises in nearly every country in the region. These crises, while 
emanating from the financial domain of the economy, had serious effects on the real 
economy (in why have all failed UNU). The most important of these crises happened in 
each of the big three economies: Mexico (1994-95), Brazil (1998-99) and most 
dramatically in Argentina (2001-02). 
The Historic Moment of Neostructuralism 
The rise and fall of paradigms, as we have seen with structuralism and neoliberalism, are 
closely associated with the prevailing historical conditions regarding their developmental 
performance and the policy making dynamic. Neostructuralism was born, and grew to 
prominence in a particular historic moment of Latin America's history, although at a 
country level the transition was specific, and in some places has not yet begun. 
The neostructuralist paradigm was born in the context of a generalized 
development crisis. This crisis was much more severe than the conditions prevailing 
during the emergence of structuralism or neoliberalism. Thus, especially in the founding 
document of neostructuralism (ECLAC 1990), a sense of immediacy can be detected, of 
pragmatic, achievable objectives, rather than idealistic distant futures. As well, it was 
founded at a time of the apex of neoliberal globalization's ascendance. It is thus not 
surprising that neostructuralism accepted the basic tenants of the new economic model, 
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especially with regards the openness to the world market. Even so, over the course of the 
1970s and 1980s, as neoliberal development theory and neoclassical economics gained 
prominence, the special economic field of development economics was all but eliminated 
from economics departments. Neostructuralism aims to reactivate the lively traditions of 
the 1950s and 1960s that apply economic theory to the specialized contexts of developing 
countries. One neostructuralist remarked on how younger economists, trained strictly in 
the neoclassical synthesis, lacks the creative thinking and adequate breadth of knowledge 
that comes from the loss of a distinctly Latin American tradition of independent, 
valuable, and enriching cultural heritage (Sunkel 1993). 
Neostructuralism then came into prominence in policy making circles as the 
neoliberal reform agenda became exhausted. The market reform agenda was largely 
inspired by neoliberal idealism; it was understood that a move towards neoliberalism was 
desired, but it was not clear how much was possible or desirable. Thus, neoliberalization 
continued up until reform fatigue set in. By the second half of the 1990s this is exactly 
what happened, as earlier political strategies for the implementation of reforms such as 
deception or authoritarianism became difficult to sustain, and social movements in 
opposition to the reforms grew. By the early years of the 21st century, Latin American 
governments emerged that were committed to the new economic model but hesitant to 
undergo more restructuring. Instead, they focused on modulating the contradictions and 
social tensions that had emerged as a result of the reform process, while humanizing the 
role of government. 
It becomes clear that neostructuralism played a very different role than 
neoliberalism had. Rather than being idealistic, it focused instead on accepting the status 
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quo, and progressively modifying from there at the margins. In the prevailing context of 
neoliberalism's ascendance it would have been impossible to challenge it directly. 
Instead, it "captured neoliberalism's thunder" (Leiva 2009) right at the time when 
neoliberalism was losing its ability to be a viable ideational pull for policy makers. In this 
sense neostructuralism was a complimentary successor to neoliberalism. The neoliberal 
paradigm's focus on marketization was less able to handle social and political counter 
forces. As these counter forces grew, the extent of neoliberalization was accepted as 
sufficient, and neostructuralism took over. From this position, neostructuralism could 
rebalance the development agenda through progressive improvements. 
Neostructuralism from a pragmatic stance that accepted the status quo and 
intended to cause change gradually at the margins of policy spaces, served to deepen and 
generalize the marketization program into the social and political realm. In doing so, 
oppositional forces to the new economic model were pacified, as the new approach 
attempted to address their concerns. The neostructural paradigm aims to construct 
institutions of social intermediation that are better suited to meet the needs of the new 
economic model. Increased attention to poverty and equity serve to counteract social 
tensions, while the focus on consensus and cooperative action subsumes political 
opposition. The overall effect of neostructuralist policies is thus to stabilize the system, 
consolidate the reforms, and provide new avenues for constructive reformulations that 
maintain the coherence of the economic model. 
The momentum of Latin America's development history thus seems to have been 
caught between opposing dialects revolving around the proper role of the state in the 
development process. Structuralism found the state to be too weak, while neoliberalism 
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too overbearing. The lessons and failures of these two approaches to the role of the state 
were thus central in the neostructuralist approach. Accepting the neoliberal's successful 
reduction in the scope and size of the state, neostructuralism would instead argue for a 
different kind of state, focused on its efficiency, and strategic capacity to promote 
development. It was then, in large part, the failure of both 'good revolutionaries' and 
'well intentioned free-marketers' (Santiso 2006) that served as the historical backdrop for 
the emergence of pragmatic neostructuralism. 
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Chapter 3: 
The Neostructuralist Synthesis 
Neostructuralism should be considered as a unique paradigm in its own right. Over years 
of reformulation, ECLAC produced the neostructuralist synthesis that attempted to build 
off of insights provided by both structuralism and neoliberalism. The struggles to address 
the deficiencies in the structuralists thinking, while overcoming the narrow neoliberal 
focus were at the heart of the new paradigm. The new paradigm brings together a diverse 
set of innovations by creating new concepts and new modes of theorization. The course 
of thinking that ECLAC theorists went though in the course of the 1980s is instructive in 
how they arrived at the main principles. In particular, neostructuralism drew heavily from 
Fernando Fajnzylber, former head of the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization. By exploring the evolution of thinking at ECLAC, the intellectual 
convergence at the end of the 1980s that produced the neostructuralist synthesis and the 
focus on the new conception of the role of the state will reveal how neostructuralism 
overcomes seeming contradictory ideational pulls. 
Evolution of ECLAC thinking 
The first formulation of ECLACs thinking on Latin America's economic development 
challenges was centreed on theorizing about the structure of the worldwide economic 
system and the ways in which surpluses were generated and transferred within that 
system. From this perspective, ECLAC argued that Latin America was in a disadvantaged 
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position and that a concerted drive by the state was necessary in order to deliver 
economic development. Industrialization was the linchpin of the strategy, and this was to 
be achieved by substituting previously imported goods with domestically manufactured 
ones. Elements of this ISI development strategy were widely implemented in the region 
in the 1950s and 1960s, especially in the medium and larger republics. 
By the 1970s, ECLAC s influence on economic policy had declined, while a 
strategy of export promotion and export substitution gained ground. With the arrival of 
the debt crisis and the 'lost decade' of the 1980s, the state ceased to be a useful agent for 
development as it was captured by the forces of organized business that no institution was 
strong enough to contain (Iglesias 2006). A decade of costly stabilization and 
liberalization ensued, guided by the principles of the "Washington Consensus". 
Meanwhile, ECLAC was engaged in a process of self-reflection, learning, and 
reformulation. In the early years of structural adjustment, ECLAC proposed a program of 
"expansionary adjustment" that involved renewed lending from the creditors, and an 
easing of fiscal austerity. These ideas manifested in the unsuccessful heterodox 
stabilization programs of the late 1980s. The chief concerns of this incipient 
neostructuralist focus were short term macroeconomic in nature. In terms of long term 
development strategy, there was less of a consensus on what direction to take. The 
former head of ECLAC during the emergence of neostructuralism comments on ECLACs 
projected image: "For many years, there was no synthesis of the internal debate into a 
renovated and coherent message, but rather different proposals that offered ambiguous 
and even contradictory signals regarding the institutional stance" (Rosenthal 2000). As a 
result, ECLACs influence was in serious jeopardy. It was basically unclear to which side 
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the new ECLAC should lead - back to its structuralist roots or along the new neoliberal 
lines: "Some staff members leaned toward defending the cepalino message of yore, 
while others were finding certain merits to the theoretical winds that were starting to 
blow, specially in the Southern Cone." Rosenthal eventually chose to adopt Fajnzylber's 
ideas (Fajnzylber 1990), and together they crafted the outlines of the new paradigm. 
Just as the neoliberalism was achieving dominance by 1990, ECLAC launched its 
new development paradigm with Changing Production Patterns with Social Equity. A 
wider body of work that was produced in circles associated with ECLAC since that time 
has come to be known as neostructuralism, of which the above mentioned is a component 
part. This successor to structuralism shared several analytic elements with its 
predecessor, however, as it was produced in a very different global economic and 
intellectual context, its ultimate policy prescriptions diverged considerably. 
The new neostructuralist paradigm attempted to learn from both the limitations of 
the then dominant neoliberal paradigm and also the shortcomings of its structuralist 
predecessor. The challenge for the neostructuralism was to take advantage of the insights, 
tools, models, and concepts of both these paradigms. If it were to overcome and displace 
both previous paradigms, it would need to produce a synthesis of the previous opposing 
ideas. The synthesis could not merely be a combination of elements of each, as this 
would have produced too many internal contradictions. It had to propose an entirely new 
analytic framework, a new vision of development, whose internal consistency and 
discursive innovations could not be challenged by either of its forebears. The synthesis 
began with a critique of the earlier paradigms, to understand their strengths, limitations, 
and ultimate usefulness for the new paradigm. 
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Neostructuralists recognized that neoliberalism was based on an extreme, 
unbounded rationality. Neostructuralists, like the structuralists before them, argued that 
individual economic choices are based on historical-cultural customs that cannot be 
captured within a narrow reading of economic behaviour. 
One the most significant critiques of the neoliberal paradigm was its focus on 
static, rather than dynamic comparative advantages. Neoliberals argued that each country 
ought to specialize in whatever it could produce most competitively at any given time. As 
a consequence, it was argued that neoliberalism offered little hope for escaping a heavy 
dependence on the production of primary commodities (Peres 2006). 
The neostructuralists recounted the problematic history of neoliberal experiments 
since the 1970s. They showed that drastic liberalization programs, especially in the 
financial domains, can lead to widespread destabilizations, the spread of economic 
bubbles, rampant speculation, and ironically widespread anti-competitive behaviour. The 
dangers of this destabilization were amplified by to the reductions of the state apparatus 
that accompanied neoliberal reforms. There was an increased recognition that private 
interests may undermine the social interest just as much as an overbearing state could. 
Neoliberalism, especially the New Political Economy school associated with it, identified 
several weaknesses with the prevailing models of state interventions, but they failed to 
recognize market generated problems. They used the ideal of a perfectly competitive 
economy in their models, but this ideal was never realized in practice. 
Neostructuralists also pointed out that neoliberalism was highly idealistic. It 
offered an ideal model with which to strive to, but it suggested no way of moving from 
the really existing situation towards that model. It was almost as if initial conditions did 
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not matter, and all restructuring programs in all countries should be alike, and as rapid as 
possible. Finally, the neostructuralists argued that the neoliberal inspired structural 
adjustment programs of the 1980s were unnecessarily highly regressive. The reduction in 
aggregate expenditure that these programs required proved to have major social 
consequences, causing unprecedented increases in inequality. 
Neostructuralists also looked backed to the earlier problems with the structuralist 
paradigm, including the reasons for its decline and ultimate demise. They accepted one of 
the main criticisms leveled against it, that it had an excessive confidence in the value of 
state interventions. Structuralists had always held that private actors were the foundation 
of any development model, but they failed to recognize the potential drawbacks of state 
interventions, causing them to grow unchecked. While the neostructuralists support a 
strong and capable state, they balance this with an acknowledgement of the limits to 
interventions and the risks that they carry. 
The neostructuralists also pointed to the exaggerated and prolonged pessimism 
that structuralists held with regard foreign markets. Originating with the Great 
Depression, structuralists viewed international markets as unreliable, both as a destination 
its exports and also a market for essential imports needed for industrialization. This 
export pessimism unfortunately carried on through the 1950s and 1960s, even while 
global trade expanded at unprecedented rates. 
There was also a recognition that the structuralist paradigm was less able to 
respond to short-term fluctuations. The style of macroeconomic management promoted 
was unable to handle conjunctural problems, especially of the financial and monetary 
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types. Overall, the structuralists were excessively focused on long-term trends, and failed 
to recognize the significance of short term macroeconomic balances. 
The structuralists were also faulted for focusing too much on the demand and 
circulation sides of the productive structure, and not enough on the supply. The growth of 
the domestic market was a way to encourage industrialization through its backward 
linkages but this happened at the expense of an efficient, productive, and competitive 
productive supply. 
The New Neostructural Strategic Development Vision 
The neostructuralist development vision begins by addressing the immediate challenges 
facing Latin America. It is understandable, after the lost decade for development, that any 
new development strategy should place the reactivation of growth at the forefront of the 
agenda. Latin America had for centuries experienced growth, even if at times erratic, up 
until the 1980s crisis. However, it has always proved difficult for Latin America to 
reconcile economic growth with an equitable distribution of income. Early 
neostructuralists made use of a metaphor of the 'empty box' (Fajnzylber 1990)to describe 
the frustrating tendency of Latin Americas productive system to produce growth without 
equity. The so-called 'trickle down effect' never materialized in Latin America. 
Attempts to start growth, and afterwards work for a more equitable distribution, have 
historically failed. Nevertheless, using a broad arrange of cross country studies, 
neostructuralists argue that growth and equity are not necessarily mutually exclusive 
(ECLAC 1992). There are a number of different types of growth that are especially 
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reconcilable with equity, and a number of different policies that can promote their 
complementarities. 
They argue that economic policy should not only be concerned with promoting 
growth, but also with consideration to the distributional impacts of that growth. Similarly, 
they argue that social policy aught not only to consider equity, but also with the aim of 
promoting competitiveness enhancing social policies. Neostructuralists thus do not 
merely try to promote one goal at the expense of the other, but to achieve a maximum 
degree of complementarily between them. Too often, ECLAC pointed out, the 
antagonisms of the two objectives are highlighted, whereas opportunities for their mutual 
promotion are overlooked. The goal then, is to strengthen complementarities and reduce 
trade-offs. In order to achieve these integrated goals, neostructuralists see an important 
role for the state. Pure market oriented approaches tend to sacrifice equity too much for 
growth, from the standpoint of the social good. The state thus has a role to play to guide 
market behaviour to promote the virtuous positive feedback loops between growth and 
equity. Neostructuralists highlight how policies directed at human capital accumulation 
and productive employment have especially strong effects at promoting both growth and 
equity, and are consequently at the centre of the strategy. Direct transfers to the poor, 
though sometimes necessary in the cases where social justice demands it, do have 
positive equity effects but often occur at the cost of reduced growth. 
Finally, neostructuralists cannot imagine a political climate able to reconcile the 
difficult challenges between growth and equity that is not democratic. In this way, the 
neostructural paradigm is an integrated program with a total socio-economic vision. It 
aims to combine economic growth, social equity, and political democracy. These three 
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goals must ultimately be promoted as one, and the heart of the strategy is to advance a 
series of "virtuous circles" that are mutually supportive. Neostructuralists argue for a 
national consensus amongst government planners, the private sector, and civil society 
around the fundamentals of the development project. There must be a social consensus 
behind development drive, given the systemic and integrated nature of the challenge. The 
extremes of populism and technocratic policy making must be brought together through 
democratic consensus and participation. Neostructuralism thus goes beyond market-
centric forms of social coordination to include networks of trust, consensus, and 
cooperation (Leiva 2009). 
In order to promote these different yet related goals, neostructuralists argue that a 
widespread industrial restructuring is inevitable. The previous industrialization period 
from the 1930s to the 1970s has been described as being based on two main drivers, 
neither of which particularly promoted the virtuous circles desired (Ramos and Sunkel 
1993). The natural resource sector was chronically underdeveloped, with few links to the 
rest of the economy, and the industrial sector's growth was dependent on protected 
markets. Furthermore, the two sectors had few links. Instead, neostructuralism calls for 
the utilization of an industrial strategy based on the technical innovation of the processing 
of the natural resource base. In this way, neostructuralism combines the structuralist's 
focus on investment, and the neoliberal's focus on competitiveness, into a unified drive 
for competitive investment. 
There are several components to the integrated solution to the 'black box' 
problem, signifying the difficulty in absorbing and generalizing technical progress in the 
production fabric (Fajnzylber 1990). Some innovative concepts have been advanced in 
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this respect, and certain thematic areas have been emphasized. They include: the 
centrality of technical progress; genuine competitiveness; systemic competitiveness; 
proactive labour flexibility; and the investment and consumption patterns. 
Neostructuralists see a fundamental role for technological transformation in their 
overall strategy. The purposeful absorption of technical progress is able to support 
sustained increases in productivity, and these gains will further productive employment, 
the linchpin of growth and equity. In order to compliment this dynamic, the strategy is 
focused on those subsections of industry that are especially good at incorporating and 
disseminating technology to the wider productive structure. The overall aim in this regard 
is a "creative domestic effort to shape a productive structure that is functional to the 
specific national deficiencies and potentials" (Fajnzylber 1983). In Latin America, given 
their moderate level of industrial progress, the adaption and absorption of existing 
technology was desired. 
In order to achieve these goals, neostructuralists argue that Latin America must 
meet the new regime requirements of the globalization process. They argued that the type 
of globalization that Latin America had so far been involved with was not optimal, and 
that there were other ways to engage with the global economy that were more beneficial. 
In particular, they argued for a "high road" to globalization (ECLAC 1990). The 
difference between the high and low roads depends on the way the globalization process 
is regulated at the global, regional, and national levels; on the macroeconomic regimes 
used to balance the conflicting forces within; as well as the micro-foundations of 
integration with the new global production structure. The heart of the strategy to achieve 
this high road to globalization was to increase exports and to incorporate in them a higher 
66 
technological content. The problem with the previous, low road to globalization was that 
the basis of its competitiveness was on low wage costs and devaluations. This meant that 
social equity was incompatible with economic growth. Higher technological content 
could break the cycle of low return export growth that had previously characterized the 
primary export sector. While neostructuralists see globalization as inevitable, they do see 
that the particular form it takes is directly related to the policies chosen to manage it: 
"Although forceful technological and economic processes underlie it, there is no doubt 
that the globalization process can be shaped, and indeed the form that it has been 
assuming has largely been shaped by explicit policy decisions" (Ocampo 2002). From 
this perspective, globalization can be turned into a positive force if enlightened policies 
are adopted - deeper structural problems with globalization are not considered. 
Neostructuralism makes use of a new conception of competitiveness, especially at 
the international level. They define competitiveness as the ability to retain or gain market 
share, while increasing the standards of living of the people, in the context of an 
increasing exposure to international markets. While neostructuralism does accept the 
neoliberal focus on competitiveness as a benchmark for productive progress, it holds that 
competitiveness must be understood in the socioeconomic context of each country. That 
is, a country's competitiveness is not just the average competitiveness of the firms in a 
given country. Rather, neostructuralists develop a conception of structural, or systemic 
competitiveness (OECD 1986). This conception accepts that competitiveness is partially 
a function of the management of individual firms, but it also includes the competitiveness 
of the wider productive structure, the scientific and technological infrastructure, the 
education system, and the existence of support services, such as financial, engineering, 
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design, and transport. These externalities determine international comparative advantages 
beyond what would be expected by any given firms internal organization and the price 
system. From this perspective, it is not individual firms that compete in global markets, 
but entire social systems. Brazil competes with Korea, just as Brazilian car manufactures 
compete with Korean car manufacturers. For this reason, neostructuralists see further 
reason for the use of the state to help integrate these various aspects in a coherent way 
that supports the overall competitive industrial transformation. The systemic nature of 
competitiveness also underlines the neostructuralist drive for efforts to unify entire 
nations around the development strategy. 
In support of the promotion of systemic competitiveness, neostructuralists support 
a reorientation of labour relations (ECLAC 1992). Whereas neoliberals were hostile to 
trade unions, as they were a form of market monopoly that could distort ideal prices, 
neostructuralists hold that they have a role to play in supporting equitable growth. 
However, they argue that the nature of the trade unions must change. In previous years, 
the labour movement was characterized by confrontation with capital and management. 
However, in the new international environment, neostructuralists argue that labour and 
management need to come to terms with their common interests. From this perspective, 
management is no longer the strategic enemy of labour, but rather international 
competitiveness is. Thus, labour needs to accept certain productivity enhancing measures 
as compensation for higher wages, thus maintaining the firm's international 
competitiveness. 
Neostructuralists accept the idea that in recent years a new techno-economic 
paradigm has emerged, that increasingly demands flexibility in the organization of 
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production. From this basis, labour is to accept 'proactive labour flexibility', including 
increased ease of hiring and firing employees. They are to be compensated by increased 
support for education and training, in a coordinated effort with the wider social policy. 
These proposals are to increase the flexibility of individual firms to adapt to rapidly 
changing conditions, to help workers adjust to the new labour market, and to support the 
overall systemic competitiveness of the economy. 
Another central concern neostructuralism are the growth and equity effects of 
investment and consumption patters. They argue overall, investment rates are too low, 
that savings and investment can be supported by specific state actions. Private and public 
austerity can both contribute, and wage earners must also increase their savings rates. The 
patterns of consumption are criticized for the tendency of the upper income strata to 
mimic the unsustainable and wasteful consumption patterns of the United States. These 
patterns reflect a minimal concern for the internal requirements of socioeconomic 
integration and the promotion of a solid international insertion (Fajnzylber 1990) 
Increased attention should also be paid to make sure that the institutional framework 
exists for the efficient channeling of savings into investment. 
These summarized thematic areas constitute the core drive for productive 
transformation in the context of increasing levels of equity. In addition, neostructuralism 
in a broad sense adheres to a number of principles that help define the systemic character 
of the project. While neostructuralists recognize the importance of foreign actors, such as 
TNCs with subsidiary companies operating in Latin America, as well as FDI, they insist 
that the main agents for development in this new paradigm must be found locally. The 
neostructuralist paradigm represents an attempt to develop "from within" (Sunkel 1993). 
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Latin America must find its capabilities and advantages and leverage them so that it can 
push outwards to participate in the global economy and reap the potential rewards that 
this interaction promises. In a broader sense, the paradigm seeks to develop from within -
to outwards. Neostructuralists are also conscious of the need to combine short and long 
term strategies. Structuralism's focus on the long term structures was needed to be 
combined with the neoclassical tools that are useful to define short term equilibriums. In 
effect, short-term strategies are at the forefront of the neostructuralist strategy, but these 
short-term proposals are always selected in such a way that they also contribute to, or at 
least do not undermine, the long term effort. 
Overall, neostructuralism shares much in common and in difference with its 
structural and neoliberal predecessors. The essence of the strategy clearly shares the most 
in common with structuralism. Both share the belief that a strategic development agenda, 
including the state's role within it, are able to, and should, guide the economy towards a 
specific kind of productive structure. While neostructuralists do emphasize exports, thus 
an outward oriented strategy, this emphasis has more in common with structuralism than 
neoliberalism. The essence of neoliberalism is not to argue for an outward orientation, 
but rather, from a 'neutral state of affairs', the economy would adjust as necessary, which 
just happened to be towards the world market. While structuralism argued for inward 
oriented development, the important aspect in common, given that the international and 
domestic conditions were so different, is that both structuralism and neostructuralism 
both argue that the correct productive orientation can be determined and worked towards. 
In addition, technology has long been a central feature of structuralist thinking, and it 
continues on in neostructuralism. In terms of the strategic development plan, the 
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neoliberal influence is most noticeable in terms of the main agents for development, the 
private sector. The characteristic neostructuralist thinking of "government-assisted, free 
market" places private actors at the forefront. The rational and entrepreneurial dynamism 
of individuals remain at the centre, with the state designed to a supporting role. 
A Better Balance Between the Market and the State 
The neostructuralist paradigm argues that lessons can be learnt from both structuralism's 
excessive confidence in state interventions, as well as the neoliberal's basic critiques of 
them. The balance between the state and the market would play a foundational role in the 
wider neostructuralist development strategy. Were the neostructuralists to view the state 
as the solution, or the problem to development? The most striking part of the 
neostructuralist position on the role of the state is that they view the size of the state is not 
as important as its capacity to efficiency execute the strategic development agenda. A 
large state may be unable to effectively intervene in ways required, whereas a small state, 
modernized and efficient, may be able to act with more forcefulness (Iglesias 2006). 
In addition, there is a call to reconsider what is meant by the role of the state. 
Ocampo argues that "rather than being restricted to State actions, the concept of public 
policy should be understood as any organized form of action that pursues objectives of 
collective interest. This definition of public policy is in keeping with an awareness of the 
need to open up opportunities for participation by civil society and to work to overcome a 
crisis of the State that affects the developing world and, indeed, the world at large" 
(Ocampo 2001). This reflects the neostructuralist view that there are a whole set of actors 
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in between the individual and the state that all have roles to play when it comes to the 
public good. 
In this sense, neostructuralism shares more in common than structuralism, at its 
core, neostructuralism holds that the state can, and should, intervene in markets beyond a 
basic regulatory way. The state should envision a type of production structure that is 
conducive to meeting developmental goals and guide the economy to that structure. 
Neostructuralism argues that the market, in its current state, is unable to efficiently 
organize economic behaviour on its own, because it is plagued with structural distortions, 
incomplete markets, asymmetric global integration, and a host of externalities, especially 
those related to learning processes. Overall, the development paradigm may be described 
as a "government assisted, free market strategy." Some of the core areas of focus for state 
action are summarized in the following terms: 
The central economic function of the state may be defined as devising a 
strategic vision of the development process, maintaining basic 
macroeconomic balances and an appropriate investment climate, 
reordering incentives and relative prices in the economy in a manner that 
is consistent with this vision, and achieving the constructive commitment 
of all social and political sectors to the strategy, by means of dialogue and 
concertation. A state that is efficiently organized around this central 
function could be called a 'concerting state', and it can be argued that this 
is what is suitable for this new stage of development in Latin America, 
characterized by the revival of democracy and increasing private sector 
responsibility in the development process (Salazar-Xirinachs 1993). 
While neostructuralism does not accept the minimal neoliberal state, it does make use of 
a number of neoclassical tools for evaluating state actions and attempts to find the 
optimal type and amount of intervention. Intervention was seen as sometimes necessary 
but it was also necessary to understand the consequences of state actions. 
Neostructuralism makes use of, but does not limit itself to, the general theory of 
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distortions and welfare in this respect. This theory had grown in influence in the 1970s as 
it provided concrete ways of modeling state interventions and other distorting effects on 
the economy. Neostructuralism makes use of a flexible version of this theory that takes 
more non-market factors into account, such as the institutional environment. The 
neostructuralists also sought to expand the application of a rationalized treatment of 
distortions beyond the realm of state interventions, and into the realm of endogenous 
structural distortions, an area that had occupied the concerns of developmental 
economists for decades. Some of the interventions deemed necessary owning to 
endogenous market distortions were the following: promotion or stimulate missing 
markets, such as those for long term capital, futures markets, and foreign exchange; 
strengthen incomplete markets, such as that for technology; eliminate or correct structural 
distortions, such as the concentration of property, the segmentation of capital and labour 
markets; and eradicate or compensate for market imperfections arising from economies 
of scale, externalities, and learning. 
Neostructuralism essentially tries to find out how the state can be used to structure 
and regulate markets so their theoretical virtues can be realized. Markets are seen to be 
desirable only if they are efficient. To do this, they also make use of another neoclassical 
tool, the second best theory of welfare economics. This allows economists to model how 
an economy may transition from any given distorted state toward a desired ideal state. 
Empirical evidence shows that assumed improvements in welfare do not necessary occur 
when selected distortions are removed, but rather, the welfare effects of distortions 
happen systemically. This is a significant finding, as it shows that not always are less 
distortions better. Rather, the net effect of a greater number of distortions may result in a 
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more efficient economy. Because the markets will never be free of distortions, it is 
always necessary to model different scenarios of distorting effects, rather than simply 
argue that less distortions means more efficiency. 
In light of the concluded necessity for state interventions, the neostructuralists 
sought to overcome the previous fault that structuralism showed in this area. The New 
Political Economy school had earlier highlighted the tendency of interventions to 
continually increase, owing to the fact that the beneficiaries of interventions are often 
concentrated, thus able to effectively lobby the state in favour of them, whereas the losers 
of interventions are usually spread out throughout the economy, thus being unable to 
articulate their interests (Krueger 1974). In order to overcome this tendency, and to 
maintain an optimal amount of state intervention, they must be subject to controls that 
prevent their so-called 'geological' build up. This tendency calls for the use of a host of 
automatic stabilizers and counterbalancing mechanisms in economic policy. Some 
proposed strategies to achieve this are: establish a cap on the total amount of subsidies 
given, so that there is a competition over their use, thus favouring their optimization; 
promote the flexibility of subsidies, and possibly even legislating that subsidies need to 
be temporary, and subject to renewal; and to establish a maximum ceiling on the total 
amount of tariffs, so that as certain tariffs are increased, the others must decrease so that 
the total amount remains the same (Salazar-Xirinachs 1993). 
In addition, neostructuralists argue that the guidelines for interventions should be 
transparent and limited. A key idea is to remove distortions at the source, rather than 
chasing follow-on effects. This will reduce the total number of distortions and increase 
their efficiency. It is argued that interventions should be kept under tight control, because 
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if there are too many, the effects of each intervention become more clouded and it is hard 
to know which ones are working and what needs improvement. This kind of control over 
policy-making was not done by the structuralists, as there was a great lack of the data and 
the tools to make sense of them in those years. This new kind of intervention can be 
summarized by "effective selectivity" (Fajnzylber 1989). 
Given that Latin American governments are to pursue these strategic interventions 
in a context of very limited resources and capabilities, neostructuralists argue that a clear, 
economy wide set of intervention priorities should be established. They argue for a new 
techno-economic and organizational paradigm guiding policy interventions. Elements of 
this paradigm include: the role of flexible strategic planning mechanisms; decision-
making processes and the implementation of plans of action in a changing and 
intrinsically uncertain world; and the importance of management, or complexity 
handling, including the ability of both public and private agents to reach agreement in a 
complex environment (Kliksberg 1988). These measures are seen to be able to increase 
the overall efficiency of policy management. 
The neostructural paradigm also calls for a reorientation of the focus of state 
functions. Neostructuralists argue that the entrepreneurial and productive functions of the 
state have become less necessary, while the basic and auxiliary functions have become 
more crucial. Some of the basic functions of the state, that neostructuralists argue need to 
be focused on include: the legal framework; the police and security forces; the 
maintenance of macroeconomic equilibrium; equity; savings and investment; 
infrastructure development; the provision of basic health services; and an advanced 
education system (Stiglitz 1998). In the neostructural paradigm, these functions are seen 
75 
to be the bedrock of state activities, and should never be scarified for the promotion of 
other functions. Some auxiliary functions of the state that neostructuralism sees to be also 
necessary, but secondarily to the basic functions and depending on available funding and 
capacitization are: the support of competitiveness; human resources; technology 
development; the enhancement of the regulatory environment; access to credit and 
financial intermediation; and scientific and technical infrastructure. Neostructuralists hold 
that a strengthening of these functions does not imply the growth of the state, but rather 
the improvement in its management (Iglesias 2006). Neostructuralists see a smaller role 
for the entrepreneurial functions than had the structuralists. This is partly because since 
the 1950s, the domestic entrepreneurial management class has grown in its ability to take 
over these functions from the state. In this way the state's involvement becomes more 
focused, with targeted interventions limited to those that produce the highest returns. 
This will help keep the overall development goals clear and allow the state to focus on its 
priorities. 
As part of limiting the state's direct involvement in entrepreneurial and 
productive functions, neostructuralists support the privatization of some SOEs. 
Privatizations can occur in combination with strategic subcontracting, shifting 
management duties onto the private sector. The state should limit its involvement to areas 
where private interests are interested in capturing monopoly or other rents. For those 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that the state will retain, the neostructuralists have several 
recommendations. In general, their management and efficiency could be improved 
substantially, by changing the expectations of them. SOEs should overhaul their strategic 
plans, and scrutinize their objectives and instruments. SOEs are often called upon to do 
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much more than a private company would be, complicating their management. As a 
result, managers often circumvent regulations, causing inefficiencies at the firm and a 
lack of fulfillment of the basic objectives. This occurs especially because there are few 
effective control mechanisms over the management of SOEs. As a result, 
neostructuralists argue that SOEs should be given more autonomy to set prices and 
policy. Strategic objectives can be coordinated with state managers, but internal resource 
allocation is best achieved autonomously at the firm level. SOEs should not be required 
to provide extensive subsidies through their own price system. One solution to the 
general problem of the strategic management of the SOEs is to promote their 
transparency. With increased public awareness of the activities of SOEs, they will be 
more inclined to institute rigorous quality control mechanisms. Neostructuralists also 
argue that private-public partnerships are generally preferable to complex bureaucratic 
schemes. The key is to establish the right set of incentives that ensures that all major 
actors continually work towards the overall objectives of the strategic development 
vision. 
Part of the rationale for privatization is the improvement in the state's fiscal 
accounts. In the context of the austerity imposed by the debt crisis, the state finds itself 
with very little resources to work with. Consequendy, neostructuralists argue that the 
state should regain control of its spending, including where possible by limiting debt 
service payments, while increasing tax revenues where necessary. By restructuring 
spending, and consolidating income, the 'fiscal space' to implement the development 
objectives may be gained. Arguments have been put forward to, whenever possible, to 
preserve spending on crucial areas such as those directed towards human capital 
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accumulation. As well, they do argue that higher rates of pay for government managers 
could increase efficiency, if these were combined with staff reductions, generalized 
rationalizations, and the use of subcontracting activities. 
In order to achieve all of these goals, the neostructuralists argue the state must be 
modernized, decentralized, and depoliticized. The central government is often overloaded 
with responsibilities, whereas local peculiarities and participation would make better use 
of limited resources. Increased participation at the local levels would also help foster a 
sense of consensus in all levels of government towards meeting the strategic development 
objectives. 
In the neostructuralist paradigm, the state and the market are viewed as 
indispensable agents and strategic partners. While market based mechanisms of economic 
organization are at the centre of the project, the state is recognized as an important actor 
to ensure that these markets run smoothly and provide the highest level of social returns. 
The neostructuralists found that markets are often incomplete or absent altogether, and 
that the state was necessary to support market based activities. Neostructuralists qualifies 
their support for state involvement by arguing that the state must act in a democratic, 
pluralistic, and participatory manner. From this perspective, the state's direction of the 
economy must faithfully respect the will of the masses, and must be subject to changes 
(Ocampo 2001). In order to maintain support for the agenda, a concerted strategy is 
required that establishes a consensus amongst state planners, the main private actors, 
together with civil society. With a wide base of support, the state will be able to 
undertake reforms that entail high short-term costs that promise greater long-term returns. 
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The neostructuralist synthesis clearly combines elements of both structuralism 
and neoliberalism. The use of the concept of systemic competitiveness can be seen as the 
linchpin of the synthesis. The systemic character of the economic structure is a theme 
long focused on by structuralists, while competitiveness has been the focus of neoliberals. 
By envisioning the entire economy, at the national level, as the unit of analysis, 
neostructuralism successfully combines both concerns. The elabouration of the role of 
the state seems to owe most of its innovations to the advancement of measurement tools. 
Now that it is possible to quantity the results of various kinds of interventions, it similarly 
becomes possible to promote the active intervention of the state while doing so in a way 
that does not promote un-productive rent seeking behaviours. In each sense, 
neostructuralism tends to expand the frontiers of its analysis, taking more into 
consideration than either the structuralists or neoliberals had. This allows it to incorporate 
more analytic considerations, whiles its discursive complexity and systematic movement 
through a series of analytic steps keeps the overall drive clear. 
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Chapter 4: 
The Integrated Policy Framework 
Latin American neostructuralism does not only provide a theoretical basis for 
understanding the problems of underdevelopment in the region, but it also puts forward 
concrete proposals for change. Whereas national governments are often found to lack 
sufficient institutions to coordinate policies in the economic, social, and environmental 
realms, the neostructuralist agenda attempts to form an integrated policy framework, in 
which all components reinforce the overall development strategy. 
In this strategy, it is not the case that the economic policy supports growth, and 
the social policy supports equity. This approach would lead to dead-ends and costly 
trade-offs that could undermine the strategy. Instead, the policy agenda envisions a 
complete socioeconomic transformation, and uses policies from all areas to work towards 
this common goal. Even while the vision of neostructuralism is quite strong, the policies 
that they put forward are usually quite feasible, and reflect the real policy making 
situation as much as possible without country specific recommendations. In this way, 
neostructuralism does not propose a Utopian vision, but rather, a vision of marginal 
changes. They accept the status quo, and attempt to move from there in the desired 
direction. In this way neostructuralism can appear to be strongly neoliberal in its 
orientation, and that certainly would be the case in early years, having accepted most of 
the structural reforms in favour of marketization and a reduction in the role of the state. 
However, neostructuralism holds out the hope for continual progressive and cumulative 
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change that might eventually lead somewhere altogether different than the neoliberal 
ideal. In essence, neostructuralism attempts to 'make the current system better', rather 
than proposing a completely new system. Many of the recommendations have changed 
over time, as neostructuralism matured and a learning process occurred as the results of 
the restructuring project became clear. 
The major components of the agenda are outlined. The macroeconomic and 
productive development components situate Latin America in the world economy and 
propose ways of improving its position in the new global production structure. The social 
agenda shows how the development strategy involves an integrated socio-economic 
transformation. Finally, ECLAC s position regarding regional and global integration 
shows how it views the potential benefits of globalization. 
A Broad View of Macroeconomic Stability 
There are a considerable number of innovations regarding macroeconomic management 
in the neostructuralist paradigm. ECLAC has not produced an institutionalist book 
specifically on the topic of macroeconomics, however the contours of their 
macroeconomic vision are clearly understood. One institutionalist book, The Fiscal 
Covenant (ECLAC 1998), provides us with a detailed description of neostructural fiscal 
policy, while other aspects of the macroeconomic regime are outlined in several 
publications by leading neostructuralist economists. Jose Antonio Ocampo provide us 
with ideas for strengthening countercyclical macroeconomic management in the era of 
liberalized financial markets and turbulent boom-bust cycles (Ocampo 2008). Ricardo 
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Ffrench-Davis helps to expand the scope of macroeconomic thinking beyond what he 
describes as financieristic macroeconomics, into the critical realm of real macroeconomic 
stability (Ffrench-Davis 2005). 
The guiding principles of neostructuralist thinking of macroeconomics are 
flexibility and consistency. Each country will have at its disposal different institutional 
and regulatory instruments, and these will have to engage different macroeconomic 
situations. The flexibility allows for overcoming rigid models of the past that ignored 
important local differences, while consistency is associated with stability as it gives 
investors predictable insights of future policy. This approach overcomes the 
shortsightedness of orthodox neoliberal prescriptions and provides a consistency and long 
term sustainability lacking from structuralist formulations. 
Over the course of the neoclassical counterrevolution in development economics, 
the meaning of macroeconomic stability changed. The old Keynesian view was related to 
economic growth and full employment, making use of countercyclical tools to manage 
aggregate demand to meet these objectives. This focused with the rise of neoliberal 
thinking, which focused on low inflation, getting prices right, and maintaining a fiscal 
balance. The neostructuralists argue that the orthodox neoliberal prescription is a much 
too narrow reading of macroeconomic stability, and that the neoliberal measures of 
stability have become ends in themselves rather than means to achieve economic 
development. Instead, neostructuralists argue for a broad view of macroeconomic 
stability, that will inevitably entail numerous trade-offs between key indicators. 
Neostructuralists argue macroeconomic management must deal firstly with stability in the 
real economy. Real economic vulnerability is of critical importance, and macroeconomic 
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cyclicality and volatility is damaging to growth and equity. The main thrust of 
neostructuralist macroeconomic management is thus to keep the economy at a high 
capacity utilization, close to the production possibilities frontier. Within this framework, 
neostructuralists view macroeconomic imbalances as dangerous when they reach certain 
critical limits, within which room for movement should be provided. It is mainly outlier 
prices and ratios that may result in market prices diverging considerable from social 
prices. 
Given the number of conflicting objectives that macroeconomic regimes must 
address, neostructuralists view fiscal policy is crucial. While fiscal deficits are seen as 
acceptable in certain situations, attention should be paid towards the inter-generational 
effects of spending patterns. Fiscal policy has a powerful redistributive function as well, 
and is at the centre of efforts to promote synergies between growth and equity. 
Neostructuralists argue that public savings can play an important role in increasing 
investment ratios, in place of low domestic savings and volatile and unstable foreign 
investment. However, neostructuralists identify an obstacle with using fiscal resources in 
this manner. Fiscal accounting methods tend to lump capital investments together with 
current expenditures. With the increased emphasis that had been placed on the fiscal 
balance, the state was discouraged from making potentially profitable investments. 
Instead, it is argued that fiscal policy be based on inter-temporal solvency. This will 
allow capital investments to be accounted for over the course of the maturity of their 
financing conditions, which will be offset by the future returns that they will provide. 
The cornerstone of the overall macroeconomic regime proposed by 
neostructuralists is counter-cyclical policy. This objective aims to reduce volatility and 
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moderate boom-bust cycles in the economy. The return of growth in the 90s was 
welcome, but this growth was often very cyclical and had negative effects on the 
diversification and development of the productive structure. Measures were thus 
supported that would stimulate the economy during cyclical downswings, while 
restricting spending during boom periods. This type of management was not natural to 
the system, as financial markets tend to support pro-cyclical spending behaviour. 
Counter-cyclical fiscal policy is one way managing these cycles, and a flexible 
macroeconomic regime offers several possible tools. These include: primary spending 
caps that are linked to growth in output levels; stabilization funds that accumulate during 
boom periods, so as to provide a fiscal bonus during downturns; and a host of automatic 
stabilizers such as unemployment insurance. 
Neostructuralists recognize that not only does fiscal spending tend to exacerbate 
cyclical trends, but the private sector can too. The domestic financial systems in Latin 
America tend to amplify the macroeconomic effects of external shocks. Vulnerable 
private balance sheets are able to precipitate crises, which often result in costly bailouts, 
while preventing the financial system from providing its core functions. The lack of 
prudent regulations in the wake of the financial liberalizations combined with the 
inherent pro-cyclicality of international financial markets exacerbates these problems. 
Neostructuralists argue that the macroeconomic regime should adhere to a comprehensive 
liability policy that makes sure that private as well as public deficits do not pose systemic 
risks to the capital account. Neostructuralists also argue that the establishment of 
selective capital controls can be a useful tool in this regard. A tax on incoming capital 
may reduce speculation and instead favour long-term flows. 
84 
In attempting to address these problems, neostructuralists recognize that countries 
may be punished for their interventions, so credibility is of utmost importance. They see 
an important role for cooperation with regional development banks and the EFIs in order 
to produce transparent and confident systems of regulation. Some guidelines to achieve 
this stability are: guard against the unsustainable accumulation of debt, especially foreign 
currency denominated debt; regulate against euphoria during boom periods, including 
through the use of controls on capital inflows; and the establishment of a liability policy. 
There are also calls to further develop local currency financial markets, as 
dollarization of financial assets and liabilities is suboptimal. Prudential macroeconomic 
management can allow for a significant diversification of assets into domestic currencies. 
This strengthening of local financial systems must pay particular attention to extend 
financing capabilities to small and medium sized enterprises, which are have thus far 
been underfinanced relative to their potential profitability. 
Another element of the new macroeconomic agenda is tax reform. 
Neostructuralists argues that a system with few, but broad taxes, preferably using uniform 
rates of taxation, is preferable to a complex system with multiple nominal rates. This 
system will allow for the administrative system to be streamlined while reducing tax 
evasion thereby increasing revenues. They also argue that the potentially negative equity 
effects of selectively lowering marginal tax rates must be balanced against the positive 
impacts this has on investment levels. 
The management of the exchange rate has been the subject of continuing debate 
since the founding of the new paradigm. Two major pulls on the exchange rate are 
identified, emanating from the trade and financial domains of the economy. Exchange 
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rate regimes ought to avoid the two extremes of a pure float and a fixed peg. Instead, they 
argue that a managed float within a desired band can provide the best flexibility for 
reconciling competing interests. A managed float is argued to be possible, even with few 
capital controls, provided that the overall macroeconomic framework allows for 
coordination of fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies. Neostructuralists hold that 
active intervention into currency markets may be necessary to maintain a competitive 
exchange rate and overall macroeconomic stability. 
Development as Productive Transformation 
The new strategy of development as productive transformation with equity is the 
successor to the earlier industrial policies of the ISI era. In the new paradigm, structural 
transformation of production is necessary in order to achieve the high road to 
globalization. Neostructuralists claim that the lack of productive development policies is 
one of the key reasons why the liberalization of trade and the establishment of 
macroeconomic equilibrium did not bring about the promised growth. The project for 
productive development revolves around: increasing the volume exports; diversifying the 
export structure; increasing quality by incorporating technology; and transferring 
productivity gains from the leading export sectors to the rest of the economy. In this way, 
neostructuralists support an export oriented production structure, explicitly favouring the 
export sector above others. The entire gambit of productive development policies is 
associated with structuralism. The neoliberal paradigm held that the state had no role to 
play to guide the economy in this way. Nevertheless, neostructuralism rescues the idea of 
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productive development policies, and applies them to the open economy situation 
accepted as necessary in Latin America. The ECLAC institutional book Productive 
Development in Open Economies (ECLAC 2004)provides a recent comprehensive review 
of how productive development policies can help achieve the desired growth with equity. 
One of the key issues that productive development policies try to address is the 
infant industry argument. This holds that it is beneficial to protect or support new 
industry (in this case, pioneering export firms) until they are strong enough, having 
grown and went through cumulative learning processes, to expose themselves to the 
world market and maintain or gain market share. This argument is similar to how a 
family would protect its children until they are strong enough to live on their own. 
Competition is good for firms, but so is selective nurturing. Chang points out that almost 
all successful developed countries used some form of infant industry protection in their 
earlier industrializing years (Chang 2007). Neostructuralists find the case for infant 
industry protection sufficient to warrant targeted support for those industries with 
especially high propensities to accumulate and disseminate technical progress to the rest 
of the economy. 
Even with the asymmetries and inequalities that mark the global economy, 
neostructuralists argue that fluid access to global production is necessary in order to 
develop the productive structure. Neostructuralists support the gradual liberalization of 
trade to be joined by the establishment of full-fledged meso-economic policies These 
include: active competition policies; public regulation of non-competitive markets or 
markets with strong externalities; and the correction of market failures in factor markets, 
particularly the markets for long term capital, technology, and land. The challenge is to 
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take advantage of opportunities that liberalization presents while avoiding costly 
segmentation in production structures that is difficult to reverse (Cimoli and Katz 2003). 
Latin America's international position in the new global production structure is to 
be improved by diversifying product and destination markets while incorporating more 
locally sourced value added into the exports. A number of measures to achieve this are 
available: eliminate the anti-export bias in prices of inputs; support pioneering export 
firms that create both product and market innovations; maintain an active commercial 
diplomacy to lift barriers in developed countries, especially value added discrimination; 
support for export financing and insurance, especially for SMEs; and provide information 
about export markets, standardization, and procedures. The plan envisions entrusting this 
export promotion strategy into a single capable institution that can coordinate its efforts 
throughout the economy. All these initiatives should be moderate, so as to preserve 
market incentives; they should be temporary; subject to performance requirements; and 
they should be stable over government changes so as to foster confidence. 
While increased value added content in exports is a part of the program, 
neostructuralists argue that growth is more accurately associated with the accumulation 
of resources and capacities in the economic system. They point out that productivity 
growth is associated with increased exports, especially those with a high degree of 
processing and technological content. Ocampo (2001) defines the neostructuralist view of 
growth dynamics as "intrinsically tied to the structural context, which is made up of 
productive and technological apparatuses, the configuration of factor and product 
markets, the characteristics of entrepreneurial agents, and the way in which these 
markets and agents relate to the external environment." 
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The expansion of these resources depends on productive and technological 
linkages, entrepreneurial capacity, and the fostering of productive clusters. There is to be 
a shift from vertical technology policies towards horizontal ones, aiming to remedy static 
market failures and spread public goods. Components of this shift include: dissemination 
and diffusion of best technologies in use; continuing to improve systems and 
networks of technological information; improve conditions for financing 
technological development of firms; direct fiscal incentives for research and 
development for those firms that introduce innovations; improve the alliance among 
enterprises by simplifying procedures; and access information and fiscal stimulus. These 
horizontal policies may be combined with vertical ones in areas where technological 
innovation clusters exist. Information-communication technologies have recendy been 
highlighted as a sector that should be targeted for support in this manner. 
Neostructuralists identify national innovation systems as essential components of 
productive transformation. Neostructuralists supports a clear regional trend in terms of 
initiatives to encourage the integration of productive chains, increase local value-added 
content, and incorporate knowledge into activities with proven capacity to compete 
successfully on international markets. The innovation policies promoted by 
neostructuralists are associated with neo-Schumpeterian ideas of productive 
transformation. Innovation, defined in this way, is simply doing old things in new ways. 
These activities that have a proven ability to compete are mainly the primary export 
sectors, as well as the maquilas. Innovation systems based around these sectors aim to 
increase the density of both up and down-stream linkages, so as to increase the level of 
locally sourced value added, while leveling productivity gains between sectors that have 
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shown tendencies for rigid divisions. This innovation policy will also aim to identify and 
support the creation of new, dynamic comparative advantages that emerge from 
productive diversification. 
While this paradigm calls for the expansion of export sectors that heavily rely on 
natural resources, it also argues that natural capital ought to be used not just for extracting 
temporary rents, but that these sectors need to be integrated more thoroughly with the 
wider production system on the basis of research and conservation (ECLAC 1991). 
Policies in this area must switch from being reactive, to proactive, given the rate of 
environmental degradation. Investment should be targeted to productive techniques that 
are environmentally clean, and whose competitiveness is based on a wide accumulation 
of human, physical, and natural capitals. To achieve this goal, environmental accounting 
must extend beyond the local, national, and regional levels into a continent-wide 
perspective. From this view, the poor savings in the region looks even worse when 
natural capital losses are factored in. These inefficiencies can be moderated with specific 
efforts to recognize natural capital costs; identify the capacity of public policy to correct 
market flaws caused by the absence of effective pricing and ownership regimes; coupled 
with the acknowledgement of incomplete markets for numerous natural resources and 
environmental services. These problems must not be addressed on their own, but must be 
integrated into the overall framework of productive transformation. Various policy tools 
can potentially address some of the problems with natural resource exploitation, 
including incentivizing companies to factor in natural capital costs through the use of tax 
rebates, subsidies and tax exemptions. The twin principles of both 'polluter' and 
'consumer' pays should guide policies with regard environmental externalities. 
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Given the major pressures for restoring growth, the fierce competition for fiscal 
resources of the state, and the debilitated institutions for effective regulation, 
neostructuralists view successful productive transformation as based on the combination 
of policy instruments, action and opportunity for public intervention that is best adapted 
to the specific development problems that an economy faces, its capacities, and available 
resources. As well, given that the old ISI policies are no longer useful, and much of the 
apparatus for implemented productive development policies has been lost during the 
restructuring phase, it will be necessary to reconstruct the framework for these policies, 
which provides an opportunity to do so in a way that avoids tendencies for 'government 
failure' and other types of rent seeking that plagued earlier approaches. 
Social policy, Citizenship, Social Cohesion 
The objective of achieving growth with equity requires a central role for social policies. 
Many of these policies are completely new to either neoliberalism or structuralism. 
Neostructuralists aim to move beyond a narrow econometric view of development and 
incorporate social, cultural, and political dimensions to the debate. It is argued that Latin 
America needs to embark upon an intensive process of human capital formation and thus 
allow for higher knowledge content in production. Social transformation is thus closely 
linked with productive transformation to the ends of achieving a high-road to 
globalization based on a systemic competitiveness. To this end, structural determinants of 
income inequality must also be addressed. These ideas are outlined in the main 
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neostructuralist institutional documents and are recently expanded upon in Shaping the 
Future of Social Protection: Access, Financing and Solidarity (ECLAC 2006). 
There is also recognition that the economic system must be subordinated to social 
objectives, in line with new thinking of development that emphasizes human 
development and expanded freedoms (Ocampo 2002). With these objectives in mind, it is 
important to form integrated policy frameworks, where social policy is streamlined with 
economic policy, while the social effects of economic policies are better represented. One 
problem the neostructuralists have identified is the lack of institutions that are able to 
coordinate social and economic policies in an integrated way. Opportunities for greater 
social equity to contribute to increased growth, productivity, and investment abound, but 
it has so far proven difficult to coordinate these goals. Institutional development is thus a 
key area of neostructuralist concern regarding the promotion of pro-growth and equity 
social policies. 
The new social policy attempts to move beyond the three guiding principles 
proposed by the World Bank of opportunity, security, and empowerment. 
Neostructuralists suggest that increased attention needs to be given to a widespread 
access to resources, basic protections, increased voice, and participation. Once basic 
protections are established, the poor will be better able to undertake positive risks, 
associated with innovation. Through increased participation, the poor should be able to 
'act for themselves' and be agents of their own development. Some measures to achieve 
this are providing technical, financial, and marketing services for micro-enterprises, self-
employed and peasants. The new social policy must also continually adapt to the needs of 
the poorest sectors. "Policies aimed at democratizing access to production assets (capital, 
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technology, training, and land) are thus critical for both growth and equity" (Ocampo 
2001). These objectives necessitate increased representation of the most under-privileged 
groups. 
The new social agenda calls for addressing the root cause, not symptoms, of 
social inequalities, including education, employment, income distribution, and its 
gendered and ethnic dimensions. From a long term perspective, the focus of the social 
program rests on inter-generational inequity, that is, the mechanisms by which problems 
are transferred to the younger generations. Breaking this link is seen as necessary for 
long-term success. To achieve these objectives, social policy should be guided by 
three basic principles: universality, solidarity and efficiency. Decentralization of 
policy making as well as increased participation of the private sector are seen to be useful 
to achieve efficiency. The focus on universality and solidarity reflect the fact that social 
policies are the foundations of social cohesion. 
In order to adapt to these changes, the new social covenant rests on four pillars: 
consistency with the foundations of macroeconomic policy; job creation; social 
protection; and education and training. The social protection system should be designed 
to facilitate re-training and re-entry into the job market. If unemployment results in 
increased entries into the informal market, their productivity needs to be supported, by 
adapting social protection systems to their characteristics, meanwhile promoting their 
formalization. The social agenda also addresses the structurally heterogeneous labour 
markets that are typified by the informal labour sector. In addition to achieving labour 
market flexibility, the policy needs to be consistent with macroeconomic sustainability. 
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The tax requirements of the social policy agenda needs to be transparent so that socially 
acceptable levels are achieved. 
The social agenda has had to take into account the major transformations in the 
Latin American economies, as liberalization has entailed new social risks. The earlier 
focus on lifetime employment has been replaced by frequent job changes and skill 
requirements. This has been combined with an increased entry of women into the labour 
force, more mechanization, and an increased importance of skilled labour. New 
technologies and work processes also require increased creativity, initiative and 
versatility. Specialization has become less important as a more diverse set of skills is 
being demanded. Therefore, basic skills are more important to develop if workers are to 
have a knowledge base that enables them to adapt to new jobs. The reality of less job 
certainty and increased need for flexibility furthers the need for robust social protections 
that prevent people from falling into a vicious poverty trap in the short-term, when they 
may be well suited for the labour market in the long -term. 
Education has considerable potential long-term effects on equity, but the 
condition for them to materialize is that sufficient high-quality jobs be created. In 
addition, education policies must recognize skill-dependent income distributions so that 
the poorest sectors are not left behind. The new education policy must also recognize that 
education is not only desirable for human capital accumulation, but also for developing 
political democracy, increasing self-realization, and citizenship. Some ideas for achieving 
these goals are improving secondary school graduation rates; adapting the educational 
system to the needs of the labour market; and reducing international and social 
gaps in the use of information technologies. 
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In addition to the equity concerns of the social agenda, there has been increased 
attention to the ideas of citizenship, and rights. These ideas are elaborated on in the 
institutional book Equity, Development and Citizenship: a global view (ECLAC 2000). 
Generally speaking, the neostructuralists accept the framework proposed by the United 
Nations, specifically in their Millennium Declaration. It is noted that throughout Latin 
America, even during times of economic growth, the people are losing their sense of 
belonging, and previous ties of solidarity are weakening. There is a renewed emphasis of 
the need to 'create society', on the basis of tolerance and respect for differences. To this 
end there must be a greater participation of all social sectors in civil and political 
processes, especially the hitherto excluded parts. Contrary to the climate of opinion 
during the transition years to democracy when it was agreed upon not to stir democratic 
aspirations too strongly, the neostructuralist approach sees increased participation in 
political life as essential to arrive at equitable and sustainable policies. 
The new neostructuralist paradigm argues that inequity is not compatible with 
sustained competitiveness. The cultivation of human development is a great opportunity 
to link growth with social equity. Indeed, the new social policy reflects how integrated 
the entire development project is aiming to be, and how insufficient economic metrics of 
progress can be. In general, the social policies supported use justifications much more 
abstracted than neoclassical welfare economics requires to be justified, while 
emphasizing the structured nature of social inequity that has long been a central part of 
ECLAC thinking. 
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An Agenda for International Reform 
ECLAC has analyzed the globalization process as it relates to Latin America's 
development, and suggested a number of common objectives for the countries of the 
region to collectively work towards in Globalization and Development (ECLAC 2002). 
ECLAC begins by suggesting that efforts to resist any process as powerful as the current 
globalization process will eventually fail. Furthermore, there is no need to try, as 
globalization can be harnessed for collective benefit. Finding ways to build a more 
equitable form of globalization and to achieve the best possible position within that 
process are, consequently, the best option. 
In reviewing the global order and Latin America's position within it, 
neostructuralism finds that realities change rapidly. Volatility is noticed to be one of the 
most striking features in this regard. Frequent and severe financial crisis plagued the 
region throughout the 1990s, and capital and investment flows have varied greatly. The 
growth and collapse of investment flows into Latin America reflects another salient 
aspect, that of the productive and technological restructuring of the world economy, 
especially since 1990. The collapse of the Soviet bloc and the integration of its member 
states into the liberalized world order, the rapid growth of China and India have radically 
altered the global economic landscape. The integration of global value chains, the hyper 
segmentation of demand markets, and the particular ways that TNCs organize production 
internationally continue to pose new challenges for international policy making. Overall, 
the most dangerous element of the international order is the presence of structural 
asymmetries. These asymmetries are the focus of the neostructuralist thinking regarding 
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global reform. Developing countries are far more vulnerable than developed countries to 
international economic volatility, technological progress is extremely concentrated in the 
developed countries, and the great mobility of capital is not matched by an equal mobility 
of labour. Complementary initiatives at both the regional and global level are seen to be 
useful to correct these asymmetries. 
Neostructuralists envision a virtuous circle of national, regional, and global 
institution building. Instead of a single system in charge of regulating the global 
economy, a network of institutions that overlap and compliment each other will lead to 
the most desirable outcomes. The basis of this program is the idea of an 'Open 
Regionalism'. Integration at the regional level need not be exclusive, but can actually co-
exist and compliment hemispheric and even global integration schemes. The regional 
agenda has several important facets. Macroeconomic coordination is central. Sub-
regional integration projects have already made large advances in this area, providing 
useful peer review mechanisms to help solidify national financial and regulatory systems. 
This initiative is based on dialogue, information exchange, and the adoption of common 
macroeconomic rules. The regional agenda also calls for the strengthening of regional 
financial institutions and development banks. In particular, it sees an increased role for 
the Latin American Reserve Fund to use regional resources to provide exceptional 
financing to member nations facing severe shocks. The Open Regionalism agenda also 
calls for a harmonization of regulatory mechanisms. In the context of consolidated 
markets and increased intra-regional investment, these measures will become more 
necessary to ensure fair competition rules, while preventing TNCs from taking advantage 
of regulatory loopholes. 
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At the global level, the agenda argues for the development of institutions that 
respect diversity, and are underpinned by interdependence. Part of the problem with the 
international policy making dynamic is that no institution exists to effective protect 
interests of small states. For this reason, the smaller developing counties are encouraged 
to coordinate their interests and speak with a more collective voice in the international 
arena. Several important innovations are desired that can positively enhance Latin 
America's international position and prospects for reaping more benefits from its 
international insertion. 
Among them is the increased provision of global public goods, of which 
international macroeconomic stability is the most important. Macroeconomic stability 
benefits all countries as they collectively benefit from the externalities generated by a 
stable investment and trade climate, and the dangers of contagion are reduced. An 
increased coordination of the major economies, possibly under the jurisdiction of the 
IMF, can buffer against macroeconomic instabilities and exchange rate spillovers that 
create volatility. The global agenda also sees the possible elevation of the IMF into a 
lender of last resort for the entire world economy. It is envisioned that Special Drawing 
Rights (SDRs) could be used for financing in this regard, instead of the normal channels 
through member governments. International regulation and supervision of financial 
transactions is also desperately needed. At the very least, an increased provision of 
information regarding these transactions will allow all regulators to better design 
programs to manage the risks of financial markets. A new system for the regulation of 
capital flows to developing countries is also seen as desirable. The excessive mobility of 
capital has meant that developing countries have had to remove most restrictions and 
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taxes on capital flows, so as to attract investment. However, this makes it more difficult 
for developing countries to make the most of these flows and increases the tax burden on 
less mobile factors of production. 
The IMF is also seen as a useful instrument to support macroeconomic stability in 
developing countries. In particular, it is argued that the IMF should play a more 
proactive role in supporting developing countries aims to administer countercyclical 
macroeconomic management. When private financial markets behave strongly pro-
cyclically, making it difficult and costly to adjust to cyclical downturns, the IMF should 
step in to provide support. In addition, a more enhanced role is seen for multilateral 
development banks, both regional and international. These development banks have 
proven essential for small and medium developing countries to fill in strategic financing 
gaps that are created when international finance tends to discriminate against smaller 
countries and long-range projects. 
The neostructuralist global reform agenda also calls for specific efforts to reduce 
the asymmetries in technological concentration. A great majority of research and 
development takes place in the developed countries, which in and of itself has many 
positive externality effects on the production structure. In terms of international trade, 
there is balance between the protection of intellectual property rights of the leading 
researchers and the needs of developing countries to benefit from a global public good, 
knowledge. The current trend towards more strong intellectual property rights is viewed 
as dangerous in this regard, as it has basically a regressive effect on the world 
asymmetries in technology. ECLAC calls for the liberalization of agricultural markets in 
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the developed countries and the dismantlement of the Multi-fibre agreement, which 
undermines Latin America's efforts move up the value added chain. 
The global environment is also seen as a global public good, and efforts should be 
taken by all countries to work toward common objectives. The neostructuralists closely 
associate themselves with the United Nations environmental agenda, in part outline at the 
Rio de Janeiro conference in 1990. Energy efficiency is seen as a core principle, and to 
this end they support the Kyoto protocol on reducing carbon dioxide emissions. 
Biodiversity and conservation efforts also play prominently, and in the Latin American 
context, the preservation of wild forests is seen as crucial. Neostructuralists argue that it 
is neither desirable nor possible to 'level the playing field' between developed and 
developing countries regarding their environmental impact. Consequently, there is an 
acknowledgement of shared, but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries 
are seen to shoulder a greater burden of the costs of protecting the environment. 
The full inclusion of migration in global development discussions is also long 
overdue. The asymmetric liberalization of factors of production means that the less 
mobile elements, primarily labour, suffer. The positive global growth impacts of 
increased migration levels are highlighted, as are the impact of remittances on some of 
the Latin American economies. A global pact on migration policy can help address these 
concerns, while promoting the more balanced integration of migrants into host-country 
societies. 
Overall, the policies associated with neostructuralism seem to borrow from 
neoliberal and structuralist ideas. The key concern for the productive structure and its 
effects on growth and equity is clearly structuralist. Neostructuralists do not accept the 
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neoliberal's 'neutral' or 'leave it alone' stance toward the productive orientation. In 
addition, while the correction of market failures and meso-economic policies play an 
important role in the neostructuralist program, they do not share the neoliberal focus on 
the strengthening of private property rights generally. This is particularly evident in the 
environmental agenda, where neoliberals would argue that the principle problem is 
ownership of pollution, rather than the externalities it generates, as neostructuralists focus 
on. While the main thrust of the policy agenda does seem to be decidedly structural, the 
ways of achieving desired changes are often influenced by neoliberalism. In particular, 
the desire to quantify and measure the potential effects of policies using neoclassical 
tools is prevalent throughout. The overriding concern, that state interventions need to be 
justified is neoliberal, however the neostructuralists see more space existing for these 
types of interventions. 
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Chapter 5: 
Omissions and Contradictions 
We have seen how neostructuralism has combined elements of both structuralism and 
neoliberalism. We have also seen it embark upon a number of conceptual innovations, 
which provide a new basis for policy recommendations not found in either of its 
predecessors. However, some of these innovations come with new contradictions as well, 
stemming from insufficiently justified arguments or outright omissions of key dynamics. 
These omissions revolve around a few key themes: analytic entry point; justification of 
export bias; non-economic costs; the "heterodox paradox"; and power relations. Specific 
cases where pressing developmental problems are not addressed as a result will show the 
limits to the synthesis and the balance of tradeoffs between the ideal forms from which it 
draws from. 
Analytic Entry Point: Economic Surplus vs. International Competitiveness 
Neostructuralism uses a different analytic entry point than either of its previous 
paradigmatic predecessors. Neostructuralism frames much of its strategy for productive 
development around the idea of international competitiveness, recently enhanced with a 
systemic character. This focus on competitiveness has replaced the earlier structuralist 
focus on the economic surplus, and has led to major differences between the two 
paradigms. 
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The original structuralist thinking was very much concerned with how economic 
surpluses were generated, transferred, and invested in the world-wide economic system. 
The identified how surpluses were generated by those with access to scarce resources, 
how these surpluses were appropriated by a small investor class, how they were 
transferred overseas as profit remittances, or used for luxury consumption. Given how the 
heterogeneous production structure mean that low wages debilitated the internal market 
and limited demand growth, they thought it was central to capture the economic surplus 
and redirect it toward productive industrialization. Elite profitability could not be counted 
on to reinvest surplus productively. 
Neostructuralism uses a different analytic entry point, that being international 
competitiveness. In the new globalized market, the imperative is to maintain and gain 
market share. They implicitly argue that due to open capital markets, the surplus is no 
longer possible to capture. Surplus can leave Latin America at will, or come in as FDI or 
other investments from generation elsewhere. The key is to be competitive internationally 
so that part of the worldwide surplus naturally gravitates there. It is less efficient, and 
indeed impossible under globalization to control surplus, thus it is a better strategy to 
incentivize surplus to invest domestically. 
Nevertheless, as a result of abandoning the notion of the economic surplus and 
replacing it with international competitiveness, neostructuralism updates itself to the new 
economic realities of the 21st century but also seriously limits its ability to understand, 
much less correct, certain dynamics of contemporary Latin American capitalism. Under 
the new framework, the socioeconomic system can do everything it can to achieve 
competitiveness, but the resulting profitable firms that may result will be under no 
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obligation to reinvest that surplus back into the economy. The whole system is to be 
designed to ensure profitability of firms, yet nothing is asked of them in return other than 
the direct employment benefits the activity generates. Too often highly competitive firms 
repatriate their profit overseas or to financial markets, draining much needed capital from 
the region. 
This is a one sided relationship that can only result in growing inequality as the 
people sacrifice for private sector profitability. In this case, a key analytic insight of 
structuralism, the economic surplus, has been abandoned, because the basic regime 
requirements of globalization prevent and control of it. The effects of the lack of control 
of the surplus can be massive. During the commodities boom phase in 2006, profit 
remittances of transnational corporations operating in Latin America amounted to over 2 
percent of GDP per year (Ocampo 2007). Partly for this reason, the commodities boom 
could not be fully used as a source of funding for a more widespread industrialization 
drive. If it is impossible to capture the surplus as was possible in the early post war years 
as the neostructuralists argue, it remains critical that the development paradigm at least 
try to model and understand how the surplus moves, so that strategic efforts can be made 
to take advantage of opportunities for productive reinvestment where possible. Instead, 
the entire productive development agenda pays very little attention to this dynamic. 
Justification for Export Bias 
The neostructuralist proscription for the productive orientation of the economy seems to 
borrow from both neoliberalism and structuralism. The neostructuralists argue that the 
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overall macroeconomic and productive development frameworks should purposefully 
support an outward orientation - that is, biased towards exports to the world market. This 
bias seems neoliberal, because the neoliberals argued that a correction towards the world 
market was what the market wanted to do. However, it is essentially more structuralist, 
because it argues that a specific orientation is both possible and desirable. The neoliberals 
only suggested that the economy would orient itself outwards as a result of the natural 
correction from the previous inward orientation (Balassa 1991). 
This orientation is very weakly justified in the neostructuralist framework. It is 
one thing to argue that market failures, externalities, and time lags in learning processes 
justify state interventions. These things can be measured and accurately targeted by state 
interventions. However, it is quite another to argue that the entire economy should be 
biased toward a certain market. Neoliberals have long argued that it is impossible to 
make a correct decision because of the enormous amount of information required to make 
the calculation. It is already quite difficult for individual firms to know exactly how much 
to produce for the internal versus external market. On an economy-wide scale, the 
amount of information is far beyond what the state can manage. 
It is almost ironic, after structuralism was critiqued for having an unjustified 
inward bias, that the neostructuralists would turn around and impose an outward bias. 
This bias towards the external market is especially troublesome given several other 
related concerns. Export growth has not resulted in expected wider economic growth, and 
has resulted in especially little job creation. As well, the leading export sectors are 
increasingly dissociated from the internal productive economy, especially small and 
medium sized firms. The recent global recession and the collapse of world trade once 
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again indicate how it can be dangerous to rely on the world market so heavily. Production 
for the internal market or the world market is a decision for individual firms, not the state. 
Another salient result of the neostructuralist productive development policies in 
favour of exports to the world market are its inability to link the distributional effects of 
the productive structure to its dynamics of accumulation (Leiva 2009). One of die main 
reasons for the structuralist arguments in favour of an inward oriented development was 
that the growth of production was linked to consumption - producers had an interest in 
increasing wages because the consumers of their products were their very employees. 
This supported a widespread development drive between industry, labour and the state. 
However, under the export oriented model that neostructuralism supports, distribution has 
been delinked from accumulation. It is no longer in the interests of producers to increase 
wages, because the market for their products is overseas and has no relation to their 
employees. For this reason, the so-called 'spurious' type of competitiveness of wage 
reductions and devaluations have been so common in Latin America during the recent 
expansion of exports. This is not to argue for a specifically inward orientation, but rather 
only as a critique of the neostructuralist support for an outward orientation, and the fact 
that they do not explicitly recognize the increased difficultly in increasing the wage bill 
when exporting producers do not have an interest in the same. 
Non-Economic Costs 
Neostructuralism tends to underestimate the non-economic costs associated with some of 
its policy measures. The general pattern is that all policy and even the overall 
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development drive is seen through the lens of an economist, despite efforts to broaden its 
scope. Two examples illustrate this pattern. 
Neostructuralism enthusiastically supports many different kinds of regional integration 
schemes, including NAFTA. Trade agreements such as NAFTA are praised for the 
economic benefits they provide given the more efficient access they provide to the 
northern markets. They argue that these advantages are on the whole, more important 
than the economic costs. However, the critics of these trade agreements point out many 
other costs besides the economic ones (Vilas 2002). In the case of NAFTA, there has 
been a loss of economic sovereignty, as more and more areas of policy are outsourced to 
private regulating bodies. Regulations have grown to replace laws, and public officials 
are left with less and less avenues to redress popular disenchantment. NAFTA in 
particular does far more than just regularize markets, but in many ways is the building 
bloc of much more significant continental unions, the implications of which escape 
neostructuralists attention. Suffice it to say, neostructuralists completely ignores any of 
these concerns and focuses narrow mindedly on short term econometric considerations. 
In a similar way, this tendency is reflected in the neostructuralist support for 
innovative use of advanced biotechnology in production. As part of an emerging branch 
of industry, biotechnology is singled out as an important area to both take advantage of 
and to increase research and development. These again are taken based on their economic 
benefits. Profitability in the biotechnology sector is high, and potential applications of 
GMO seed crops, for example in the production of Soy, seem clear. However, again, the 
non-economic concerns, principally environmental, but also ethical concerns, escape the 
attention of the neostructuralists. The potential damage that GMO crops can do both to 
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humans, wildlife, and the soil itself are well documented, but are not considered 
(Schurman and Kelso 2003). More seriously, even in the environmental component of the 
neostructuralist policy framework, these considerations play a very minor role. Overall, 
the neostructuralist paradigm is exactly what we should expect if economists do not only 
provide policy recommendations, but actually write entire development strategies. There 
is a tendency for neostructuralists to ever-step their expertise. In their drive to form an 
integrated development vision that is as holistic as possible, they tend to underestimate 
the diversity of experience and knowledge required to make informed decisions about 
issues that pertain to far more than just economic efficiency. The ideal economist - as an 
advisor, showing the different efficiency outcomes of different policy decisions, is lost 
when economists pretend to know what is best for society as a whole. 
Heterodox Paradox 
An interesting contradiction that Leiva uncovers in neostructuralist thought is the so-
called "heterodox paradox" (Leiva 2009). The orthodox paradox was recognized far 
earlier when reforms designed to limit the state's involvement in the economy ironically 
increased the power of the central state to direct economic outcomes. The heterodox 
paradox, by parallel, involves the relationship between the drive for social cohesion and 
cooperation with the dynamics of export oriented accumulation. It is understandable that 
in the wake of the lost decade, economic objectives were front and centre in the 
development strategy. The imperatives of adjustment and stabilization took precedence 
over long term social development - or rather, they were seen as prerequisites for 
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sustainable development. However, neostructuralists argued that for too long economic 
objectives were being worked towards with only follow on consideration of their social 
impact - enter growth with equity. The neostructuralists were supposed to rebalance the 
economic realm with the social, that is, re-subordinate the economic to the social. 
However, in the neostructuralist paradigm, the opposite tends to occur. In combining 
social and economic objectives into an integrated strategy, the economic objectives are 
taken as fixed and unmovable, whereas the social goals are geared to support the overall 
export oriented production structure. The heterodox paradox represents the tendency for 
measures that are designed to increase the participation and activity of social elements in 
the development process, to have an unforeseen effect that causes an increased and 
deepened subordination of the social realm to the logic of transnationalized corporate 
accumulation. The policy of social cohesion attempts to have the entire society work 
towards the common goal of systemic competitiveness, but with transnational 
corporations in the driver seat of investment decisions, the entire social realm resultantly 
plays to their tune. 
Leiva finds evidence for the manifestation of the heterodox paradox with his 
innovative application of a methodology that filters the neostructuralist paradigm through 
really existing social formations of power. Thus, while neostructuralism did bring back 
institutions and politics back into the development realm, they did so in a way that 
carefully circumscribed their roles and had ready made jobs for them to do - to support 
the export drive and competitiveness of exporting firms. This kind of politics is 
reminiscent of the early days of democratization where the real significance of the return 
of civilian rule was quite short of real democracy - it was limited to a kind of democracy 
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that supported the New Economic Model. While consensus and cooperation certainly are 
preferable to coercion as a means of social coordination, the benefits are quite parochial 
when the objective of social coordination is already defined, and largely benefits 
transnational capital. The result of the heterodox paradox is that localities, municipalities, 
and the various layers of popular participation are being used to channel discontent, 
ensuring social control (cohesion), stability, and thus competitiveness. Nowhere is it 
necessary to address the underlying issues that are the impetus for the popular discontent. 
The focus on this limited type of social inclusion can actually serve, in a strategic 
sense, to undermine drives for social concerns (Petras and Veltmeyer 2005). Social 
inclusion of this type tends to co-opt the more independent social movements who are 
representations of dissatisfactions among the people. Leaders are co-opted, and the 
support base is divided and pacified. The social inclusion policies provide an avenue for 
these frustrations to be vented while not addressing any of the underlying concerns. Thus, 
the social policy serves to disarm more radical demands and reincorporate them into a the 
development drive, at the minimum muting their demands, and at the worst serving to 
redirect their energies in support of the very type of development the social movements 
were protesting. Instead, social movements are 'organized to consume', rather than to 
organize politically in a way that challenges existing power structures. 
Power Relations 
The Achilles heel of the neostructuralist paradigm is its inability to address key 
developmental dynamics that are characterized by strong power relations. The policy 
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recommendations that neostructuralism provides, in the name of political feasibility, 
never challenge powerful groups. This results that key policies which could promote 
growth with equity are not considered, while the policies that are promoted too often 
simply serve the interests of the powerful. 
Most central focus of neostructuralist thought is on cooperation. Opportunities for 
collective action with the aim of collective benefits are emphasized wherever possible. 
However, this comes at the cost of omitting sometimes necessary element of conflict in 
the development process. Neostructuralists are essentially spineless in the face of 
opposition - key policies that could have major benefits are rejected if power dynamics 
get involved. Very few of the neostructuralists policy recommendations have the effect of 
challenging a small group of powerful interests for the benefit of society as a whole. 
From this perspective, neostructuralism can be seen as very mechanistic. It sees the 
development potential as the result of simply enlightened policy, and never as a result of 
struggle against anti-developmentalist influences. "The result is a Utopian view of Latin 
American economies" (Leiva 2009). To stress the point my metaphor, if Latin America 
was a slave camp, neostructuralists would reject overturning basic slavery institutions on 
their high political cost. An unfortunate effect of this inability to challenge power is that 
the overall framework tends to reinforce existing power asymmetries. More can be asked 
of the poor and weak, because they are less able to resist, meaning they tend to bear the 
brunt of the adjustment costs. This, of course, is antithetical to the stated objectives of 
growth with equity. 
Both structuralism and neoliberalism attempted to address issues of power, but 
arguably, both did more so than neostructuralism. Structuralism was strong in its 
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treatment of power. The structuralists often recommended targeted income redistribution 
policies that were seen as necessary to overcome inherited, unjust, and socially perverse 
ownership patterns, especially land ownership. These inequalities were seen to have 
resulted from a biased property rights enforcement that systematically favoured the 
wealthy. As well, their address of the economic surplus directly challenged the interests 
of the owners of production. In a sense, the structuralists actually modeled patterns of 
power to understand why certain problems displayed such a frustrating tendency to 
persist. The structuralists did not hesitate to speak truth about developmentalist problems, 
even if they challenged powerful interests, or even if the policies were unlikely to 
succeed. Prebisch himself said that one needs to strike a balance between class 
cooperation and conflict (Halperin 2008). While redistributive measures and deep 
transformation were not always followed because of power dynamics, they were at least 
willing to propose them. This balance between cooperation and conflict is found missing 
in neostructuralism. 
Neoliberalism sidesteps the issue of power relations, arguing that in a perfectly 
competitive market, and with a restricted state, power could not use the state unfairly to 
gain advantage. The central concern of the neoliberals was that powerful forces could 
capture the state apparatus and use it for their own good - a kind of socialism for the rich. 
In addition, their emphasis on competitive markets meant that powerful firms would 
always be at the discipline of the market and competition, leaving the consumer to benefit 
the most. While the neoliberal framework has been criticized for inadvertently supporting 
powerful interests, to be fair the paradigm does attempt to address them, even if in the 
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real world the paradigm is not sufficient to withstand the onslaught of powerful 
manipulations. 
Compared to both structuralism, and neoliberalism, neostructuralism displays a 
complete ineptitude in dealing with power relations. Part of the reason for this could be 
that in the context of a return to fragile democracies, neostructuralists strategically chose 
to not address conflicting issues, in the hopes that the nascent bud of democracy may 
have time to gestate and fortify itself. Later then, power could be dealt with. As well, 
from an institutional point of view, ECLAC in the late 1980s was struggling to remain 
relevant in the development debate. Given the ascendance of neoliberal ideas, 
neostructuralism could be seen to have systematically ejected power issues so as not to 
challenge the existing power structure, making it more attractive to those holding the 
reigns of policy making. This can be seen as a sign of weakness, that power was not 
addressed for fear of marginalization. Finally, in the context of the fall of the Soviet 
Union and the return to non-ideological viewpoint, neostructuralists perhaps confused the 
necessity of conflict with revolutionary social transformation projects of the past that 
challenged power head-on. In attempting to be more pragmatic, neostructuralism 
unfortunately also ignores issues of conflict. 
Fernando Leiva identifies three major aspects of Latin America's development 
dynamic that are systematically under-addressed as a result of ECLACs incapacity to 
address power relations: transnationalization, financialization, and informalization. He 
argues that these three processes are interrelated, and should be expected to grow as their 
underlying drivers are supported by the neostructuralist development project. The 
growing transnationalization of production is argued to effectively disempower the state 
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from being able to discipline capital, a key ingredient in all developmental states. 
Transnational corporations have huge leeway and an interest to not transfer technology, 
especially under the so-called Open Regionalism agreements, or invest their surplus 
incomes back into Latin America. The transnationalization of production is linked to the 
financialization of the economy, as international capital has free access to direct 
investment decisions. The financialization results in increasing shares of income accruing 
to financiers, resulting in little if any job growth, and a large export of capital. 
Financialization is also linked with informalization, as only the largest and internationally 
linked exporters get access to finance, the local economy is largely left out. 
Informalization also is a key product of the increased flexibility requirements that 
neostructuralism supports. Overall, these three dynamics, the major over-arching patterns 
of development at the present time, are not sufficiently addressed. Neostructuralism no 
doubt discusses these trends, but they do so from a sanitizes perspective of the Latin 
American economy that ignores the idea that the interests of TNCs and internationalist 
financiers may run contrary to the interests of the people at times. Consequently, efforts 
to benefit one may come at the expense of the other, and drives for cooperation to benefit 
everyone may be ignored by power or systematically used to strengthen their own 
position at the cost of others. 
There is also a generalized lack of critical thinking of power issues where it 
arguably matters most, regarding international institutions. Two examples illustrate the 
point. The neostructuralist paradigm sees a strong role for cooperation with the IMF to 
ensure macroeconomic credibility. It also sees the IMF as being useful to coordinate the 
major economies so as to provide a global public good. However, ECLAC completely 
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shies away from a critical discussion of the EVIF and the powers that control it. It is not 
considered mat the IMF may work for an agenda that is not apparent based on its own 
declarations. More critical analyses have shown the IMF to be largely an agent of 
international banking circles whose interests in Latin America can hardly be said to be 
developmentalist. However, in ECLAC's desire to be diplomatic, it does not consider 
these possibilities, causing it to recklessly favour cooperation with the institution. 
The same occurs in another area. A key part of ECLACs current environmental 
agenda is the climate change component. ECLAC essentially accepts the position of the 
UNEP and IPCC that this is a catastrophic threat and that carbon regulation should be a 
key priority. However, they do not consider other analyses that suggest that major world 
imperialist powers are using the environmental agenda to prevent and control the 
development of developing regions. The entire UN climate change project is now being 
highly criticized for this reason, yet ECLAC dangerously accepts the need to reduce Latin 
America's carbon impact. This is extremely anti-developmentalist, has huge 
consequences for growth prospects, and will do little for the environment. ECLACs 
inability to see how, even at high levels of international development making, power 
dynamics are key to understand and unwind if real development is a possibility. 
Neostructuralists seem unwilling to challenge powerful interests in the area where 
it has the most potential to achieve their stated objectives. ECLAC has, in the 
neostructuralist era, paid little attention to issues revolving around taxation. Their policy 
recommendations are very general and universally applicable, uniform tax rates, 
widening tax base, lowering tax evasion. However, the do not discuss the real elephant in 
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the closet when it comes to tax policy - who pays taxes? Are taxes, on the whole, 
progressive, or regressive? 
Neostructuralism spends much effort to find the causes for the region's inequality 
by looking at the dynamics of the production structure. They correctly acknowledge that 
in Latin America, after tax income distribution is extremely unequal, far more unequal 
then the developed world. This is a key obstacle for development. However, if the 
structure of production were really the issue, then the same should be observed in before 
tax distribution of income. But it is not. Latin America actually has a before tax income 
distribution that is comparable to the developed world. The majority of the difference 
between Latin America and the developed countries results from the fact that in the 
developed countries, taxation is highly progressive, with the rich paying the most. As a 
result, their after tax GINI coefficients drop dramatically. This does not occur in Latin 
America. Instead, after tax GINI falls only slightly, and in some countries it actually 
increases. That the poor pay the majority of the tax burden in Latin America is an 
egregious injustice, and should be a key priority to address in any development strategy. 
The failure to tax the rich is the primary reason for Latin Americas income inequality. 
Yet because of the political resistance of the wealthy, this simple measure that could do 
so much to promote equity is ignored. A small oligarchic element pays no taxes at all, 
further skewing income distribution and creating an unlevel playing field. ECLAC should 
at least make clear that tax policy is a major issue, rather than just ignore this glaring 
reality. More good in terms of distribution of income could come simply from changing 
the tax structure to those that are common in the developing world than all the other 
ECLAC recommendations put together, even if they were successful. It is truly absurd 
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for neostructuralism not to pay more attention to this reality, unless of course, one 
understands that they are not willing to challenge power. 
No one would prefer to promote conflictive solutions to cooperative ones. 
However, in certain circumstances, conflict is a necessary component of progress. This 
can be argued especially the case in Latin America, with such an extreme income 
inequality. Its position at the lower levels of the world power structure also suggest that 
confronting certain powers may be required to promote development. In earlier epochs, it 
was clear that one component of a developmentalist state was the ability of the state to 
discipline both capital and labour. This often meant forcefully overruling the interests of 
certain powers, in projects such as land reform or corporate restructuring. Yet in the 
neostructuralist paradigm, the tendency for transnational economic powers to 
increasingly dominate the economic system results in the increasing impotence of the 
state to discipline capital. This results in a vicious circle of increasing transnationalization 
and financialization, and the increasing inability of the state to challenge these powers. 
The longer this goes on, the more conflictive solutions must be. The best solution is to 
address them immediately before social unrest becomes so great that the conflict and 
chaos that may result might not be able to be positively channelled to correct social 
injustices and better society as a whole. Neostructuralism needs to rediscover and 
reclaim the essential duty to promote social justice, even if it requires that power must be 
challenged. 
This limitation of neostructuralism can be understood because of the limitations 
placed on it because it is a UN institution. The analysis and proposals of ECLAC need to 
be roughly in line with the overall UN development mission. As well, since ECLAC is 
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funded by its member governments, it is not surprising that it favours cooperation over 
conflict - what government would fund a think tank that argued for subversive actions 
against itself? Though this is a limitation of ECLAC, we cannot really hold it against 
them. ECLAC is what it is, and has much to offer in its own right. However, it would not 
be too much to ask ECLAC to be more clear about the limitations of the synthesis in this 
regard, or even just be clear about what its paradigm is most useful for, instead of 
claiming to be a complete solution to development problems. 
Post-Crisis Development 
The neostructuralist paradigm has undergone several changes in its 19 year history. This 
analysis has looked at aspects that were present in its founding 1990 form, as well as 
more recent additions and reformulations. Neostructuralism has continually showed an 
ability to adapt to changing circumstances, while broadening its own theoretical horizons. 
The 2008-2009 global crisis and recession has had a major effect on the development 
course in Latin America, and is bound to cause changes to the paradigm (ECLAC 2009). 
The crisis has already highlighted some of the vulnerabilities of neostructural paradigm. 
These issues are the subject of increased emphasis in the wake of the crisis. 
The global crisis has transmitted to Latin America through a number of channels. 
A drop in world demand, worsening terms of trade, a higher cost and reduced availability 
of international credit, declining tourism and reduced remittances have all negatively 
impacted economic development in the region. Improved macroeconomic management 
and financial savings from the boom period means that South America is now better 
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prepared to deal with the recession than in times past, but these can only be temporary 
measures, as the Latin American economy must adjust to the new global realities post-
crisis. While ECLAC has not produced a keynote document outlining its position on how 
development strategy will broadly adjust to the crisis, indications are present through its 
tentative analyses of the crisis. Interviews with ECLAC staff and presentations during 
the ECLAC summer school 2009 give a sense of the direction the strategy is headed. 
ECLAC quickly released a set of recommendations to member governments in 
the immediate aftermath of the crisis. ECLAC argues against the rise of protectionism, 
arguing that this would be a dead-end and counterproductive. On the contrary, renewed 
efforts are to be placed on completing the Doha round of trade negotiations at the WTO. 
More trade liberalization, not less, is seen as necessary to address the crisis. 
Macroeconomic volatility is to be guarded against by the use of counter-cyclical 
macroeconomic management. In the context of this cyclical downturn, ECLAC 
recommends that governments do what they can to increase stimulus, by way of fiscal 
spending and monetary expansion. 
For the longer term, it is acknowledged that a few key trends need to be 
considered in any post-crisis development strategy. One is that the North American and 
European markets cannot be counted on as a source of demand growth in the future. The 
crisis has brought growth in these economies to a stand still, while estimations are that 
they will continue to grow at slower rates in the future. These markets are expected to be 
increasingly replaced by the Chinese and Indian markets that have shown a great 
resilience during the global recession. As a result of their continued expansion, 
commodity prices are expected to remain buoyant. The ongoing financial turmoil in 
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world markets is by contrast expected to result in a reduced availability of international 
credit for the foreseeable future. 
One key event that directly challenges the logic of neostructuralist development 
has been the decline of world trade. Neostructuralism has always argued that exports to 
the world market are the most dependable route to high productivity jobs and 
technological advancement. However, in a way similar to how the Great Depression 
ushered in a period of export pessimism, the current world recession is questioning the 
viability of relying so heavily on export markets. It could be that if this crisis turns out to 
be more prolonged than expected, more consideration for the development of the internal 
market is warranted. For now it seems ECLAC is betting on the continued rapid 
expansion of China, a bet not historically unjustified. 
Overall, ECLAC staff seems to be of the opinion that the crisis marks the end of a 
super-cycle in neoliberal reforms. Market liberalization is blamed for causing the crisis, 
and it is no longer viewed as a major development objective going forward. Instead, there 
must be a renewed emphasis on the role of the state, and specifically its regulatory and 
supervisory functions. This is in line with neostructuralist thinking for sometime already, 
but the political conditions will certainly increase the impetus for these actions. The crisis 
could be seen as a reference point officially ending the neoliberal era and beginning the 
neostructural era for this reason. The challenge for neostructuralism is to take the new 
global economic realities into consideration and propose a modified development strategy 
moving forward that even if it makes use of increased state interventions, does so with 
the utmost attention for their justification and rationalization - advancements at the heart 




This research began with the mission to unravel how neostructuralism combines elements 
of structuralism and neoliberalism into a new development paradigm that has so far 
proven more durable and appropriate to current conditions than its predecessors. There 
are clearly elements of both structuralism and neoliberalism present in neostructuralism, 
but the ability to render compatible the different foci of these paradigms into a consistent 
whole comes from neostructuralism's innovative concepts and theories. These new ideas 
flow together through a series of analytic steps: social cohesion; genuine 
competitiveness; systemic competitiveness; open regionalism; the high road to 
globalization; and virtuous circles. Neostructuralism has so far withstood critiques from 
all sides, though its efficacy will be continually challenged, both by intellectual critique 
and by new unforeseen circumstances. 
Neostructuralism shares some basic characteristics, and deviates from, the main 
ideas of both structuralism and neoliberalism. Neostructuralists share the structuralist 
belief in the basic usefulness and agency of the state to promote development. The types 
of states they argue for are different, yet they both see the state as an essential and 
positive developmental force. They also share a belief that it is possible and desirable to 
orient the productive structure at the highest levels. Structuralism promoted an inward 
orientation - production for the domestic market to achieve import substitution, and 
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neostructuralism promotes production for the world market by way of exports. They also 
share a central concern for equity, that is, they view equity as essential for development. 
Neostructuralism differ from structuralism in that it no longer begin with a world 
systemic approach that attempts to understand Latin America's unique global position. 
Neostructuralists surely try to understand Latin America's international insertion, but this 
is not the foundation of the analysis, but rather attempts to inform the strategy. 
Neostructuralists also do not focus on the idea of the economic surplus, as was central in 
structuralist thinking. International competitiveness has grown to displace the centrality 
of the surplus, though as we have seen, competitiveness is seen to be more useful a 
concept in the globalization era with little capital controls. Neostructuralists also 
combine, much more than structuralists had, both long-term and short-term strategies. 
Neostructuralist strategies are often preoccupied with short-term considerations, but 
policy recommendations in the short-term are always favoured that have positive longt-
erm effects. Long term initiatives are not always front and centre, but they are always 
adopted when possible. 
Neostructuralism also has much in common with neoliberalism. Both accept that 
individual initiative must be at the centre and the driver of development. Neostructuralists 
argue for a strong and capable state, largely to make sure that the benefits of individual 
initiative - the efficient allocation of resources in free markets - is realized. 
Neostructuralists are also aware of the costs of state interventions. While neostructuralists 
are not as vehemently opposed any form of state information as are neoliberals, they do 
recognize their costs and attempt to strategically limit state interventions to an optimal 
amount. 
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The main difference between neostructuralism and neoliberalism is the belief that 
it is both possible and desirable to orient the production structure. While both are 
associated with increasing exports to the world market, neoliberalism fundamentally 
strives for a 'neutral state of affairs', whereas neostructuralism explicitly argues for an 
outward orientation. Neostructuralism also does not adopt the neoliberal focus on 
extending private property rights as a solution for development. Indeed, neostructuralism 
often argues for policy induced resource transfers that would offend a neoliberal's sense 
of individual sovereign ownership. 
The synthetic aspect of neostructuralism that is so successful at combining aspects 
of both earlier paradigms is its attempt to combine a systemic, economy wide analysis 
while maintaining a focus on the individual. The systemic competitiveness concept 
allows neostructuralists to midwife the neoliberal focus on competitiveness in free 
markets with the structuralists concern with systemic dynamics. As a result, structuralists 
cannot complain that neostructuralists do not take into consideration the functioning of 
the totality of the economic system, and neoliberals must accept that neostructuralists 
focus on competitiveness in free markets. Individuals remain the essential agents of 
development, but they are placed within the national economic structure of which they 
are apart to analyze them. However, neostructuralism has been critiqued for its weakness 
on the systemic level. The abandonment of the economic surplus and the failure to 
supplement it with any other coherent theory of development at the world level means 
that the systemic aspect of neostructuralism is limited and cannot offer many insights into 
development problems at the national level. 
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The neostructuralists make use of a similar combination when it comes to the 
proper role of the state in the development process. Neostructuralists combine the 
structuralists' insistence that the state is a useful agent, with the neoliberal critique of the 
state, by attempting to quantify both the benefits and costs of state interventions in an aim 
to find an optimal amount of intervention. Neostructuralism has thus been said to 
promote "government assisted, free markets." 
Overall, neostructuralism is a more complex paradigm than its predecessors. This 
increased complexity and theoretical specificity have allowed neostructuralism to 
incorporate a vast array of concerns into a coherent overall strategy. This complexity at 
times makes it seem like neostructuralism is a non-development paradigm; it is simply a 
combination of the best insights regardless of where they come from. Even so, the 
theoretical glue that its main concepts and ideas provides is enough to give 
neostructuralism its own paradigmatic character that separates it from others. 
The main price that neostructuralism pays for this innovative combination is its 
inability to tackle power relations. It is likely that, should conflict be accepted as a key 
component of strategic development, then the entire focus of neostructuralism would 
change. This does not necessarily, though it has been argued, to make neostructuralism 
impotent to tackle the really existing dynamic obstacles to development in Latin 
America. Rather, it means that neostructuralism can be used as a reference point for all 
kinds of social actors, and when common interests do exist, it would be beneficial to use 
their insights. However, neostructuralism cannot be seen as enough, social actors must go 
beyond neostructuralism's cure all policy proposals to press for changes that might entail 
conflicts that the diplomatic ECLAC does not want to take part in. 
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The neostructural paradigm also suffers from what might be described as 
"mission creep". The paradigm began with the singular objectives of restoring growth 
and equity to the region. This was understandable after a decade of no growth and 
regressive transfers of wealth. However, this focus has hardly changed in the first 19 
years of its existence. They continue to view growth and equity as the only real results 
that might represent development. Neostructuralism is essentially an economic paradigm 
that sees all problems through an econometric lens. Neostructuralists ask that social, 
political, and economic actors all work toward their strategic agenda, but they do not see 
that a national development drive must include, indeed should be founded on, non-
economic issues. 
The dominance of the economic realm over the social goes deeper than the fact 
that most neostructuralist thinkers are economists. The drives for social cohesion, 
concertation, and cooperation have the effect of subsuming independent social demands 
to the logic of transnationalized capitalist reproduction. Neostructuralism does indeed 
reincorporate social and political dimensions to the development process, but does so in a 
limited way that makes sure that social demands do not challenge the requirements of the 
transnationalized sector. From a long term perspective, the drive for social cohesion can 
actually directly undermine some of the social goals that neostructuralism aims to 
redress. The heart of the problem is that neostructuralism attempts to achieve growth and 
equity, but does not start from ground zero - from a coherent global theory of 
development and underdevelopment. The social dimension, while thoroughly integrated, 
is largely an add-on or appendage to the logic of transnationalized capitalist reproduction. 
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As a result, many of neostructuralism's proposals to improve social equity merely affect 
the symptoms of social problems, rather than their roots. 
For a development paradigm with the scope of neostructuralism's vision, one 
would expect many more dynamic aspects - including issues of the organization of 
government, they system of law, personal liberties, etc. While ECLAC is an economic 
development think tank, they should recognize this themselves too, and know that 
econometric recommendations will never be enough to deliver true development, and 
political actors must think about what is at the heart of development, what is the basis of 
free and just societies. Development paradigms in general could benefit from an 
increased theoretical self-awareness in this respect. Development economists are great at 
recommending economic structures that promote efficiency, but their specialization does 
not equip them with the knowledge needed to remake entire social systems. Development 
economists, if they do want to propose system wide integrated socioeconomic 
transformations, must bring non-economic perspectives into the fold, or at least limit their 
own advice to the realm of the different efficiency outcomes of different policy scenarios, 
and leave the deciding up to the democratic process. 
The neostructuralist paradigm has proven very able to integrate new economic 
theories and realities into its framework, meaning that it will prove very difficult for any 
new economic development paradigm to challenge it in a significant way. The 
weaknesses of neostructuralism suggest however, that the development paradigm that 
grows to dialectically challenge neostructuralism could come from another basis 
altogether, perhaps from the perspective of individual rights, social justice concerns, or 
one which embraces political revolution. In the meantime, neostructuralism serves as a 
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step in the right direction, and should continue to be used as a reference point for 
discussions revolving around strategies and prospects for a better future. 
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